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 1 
Introduction 
 
A young Syrian recently told me, “We always welcomed refugees; we never thought it 
would be us.” This sentiment refers to Syria’s history of welcoming refugees from conflicts 
throughout the region. She mentioned Palestinians arriving during the Nakba and Iraqis fleeing 
war in their own country. Like most of us, Syrians never thought they would be forced to flee 
their country. This conversation brought me back to where I began this project – wondering 
about these groups that have sought refuge in Syria over the years. 
 As an Armenian American, I never thought I would end up writing this project about 
Armenians. In truth, I was uncomfortable with the idea because I felt that we Armenians were 
always writing about our own situation. However, during a migration class I became interested in 
the idea of diaspora and transnationality and how they might affect the experiences of diasporic 
communities faced with forced migration. Given the immense international focus on the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis, my interest in diaspora led me to want to explore the experiences of diasporic 
communities in Syria. I thought immediately of the Armenians and the Palestinians who, now 
driven from Syria by war, arrived under similar circumstances.  
These communities now become twice-displaced populations, as they already comprised 
what Robin Cohen (2008) calls “victim diasporas.” A victim diaspora is created by a “dispersal 
following a traumatic event in the homeland, to two or more foreign destinations” (Cohen 2008, 
2). Khachig Tölölyan (1996) describes diaspora similarly, writing, “The paradigmatic diaspora 
forms due to coercion that leads to the uprooting and resettlement outside the boundaries of the 
homeland of large numbers of people, often of entire communities’ (12). The Palestinian 
diaspora formed relatively recently, following the Nakba in 1948, and then the Palestinians 
suffered further displacements in the exodus following the 1967 War. Armenians, on the other 
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hand, have existed in diaspora for more than a thousand years, though their “traumatic event” is 
generally considered to be the Armenian Genocide, which began in 1915 and fundamentally 
altered the situation and identity of diasporic Armenians. 
Initially, I hoped to write comparatively about Syrian Armenians and Syrian Palestinians, 
given their shared but dramatically different experiences as diasporic communities in Syria. 
Whereas Armenians enjoy the legal privileges of citizenship and economic status, Palestinians 
have remained relatively marginal, in part due to the expectation of a return to Palestine. 
Additionally, Armenians today have access to a diasporic center through their relationship with 
the Republic of Armenia, while Palestinians remain exiled from their homeland. It became clear, 
however, that such a comparative study would prove too expansive for this yearlong project, and 
thus the subject of the project became the Armenians. Through this endeavor, I have grown 
appreciative of the Armenian (and non-Armenian) scholars who have undertaken the task of 
documenting the experiences of the Armenian people. I have realized that if we did not record 
our own history, no one would, and thus we would not exist. 
As I have previously stated, we often focus on the Armenian Genocide as the founding 
moment of the Armenian diaspora, but the origins of the diaspora can be traced as far back as the 
sixth century AD to large-scale deportations by the Byzantine emperor (Cohen 2008, 49). Since 
then, diaspora has become the permanent state of the Armenian nation, even prior to the 
deportations and massacres of the early 20th century.  
In conceiving of geographically isolated Armenian communities around the world as 
forming a nation, I refer to these communities’ and individuals’ self-identification with a national 
group. In declaring their Armenianness, these diasporic Armenians claim membership of the 
Armenian nation, “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited 
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and sovereign” (Anderson 2006, 6). In fact, though the geographic isolation creates greater 
physical distance between members of the transnation, this does not create a situation unique to 
the deterritorialized nation. Benedict Anderson (2006) writes that the nation “is imagined 
because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, 
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” 
(6). This characterization is equally true of the nation-state as of the transnation. When I refer to 
the Armenian nation as a transnation, I emphasize the fact that “Armenia” exists within a 
transnational space, transcending the spatial limitations of nation-state borders. 
Like any nation, the Armenian transnation is a diverse body divided by strong political 
differences. The politics of the global Armenian community are complicated by the simultaneous 
existence of strong nationalistic sentiment and these deep and divisive political differences. It is 
critical to acknowledge that, “the transnation’s different segments, though temporarily united by 
crisis, do not share the same political goals and principles” (Tölölyan 2000, 123). 
Nonetheless, since the Armenian Genocide, the Armenian transnation seems to be in a 
protracted state of crisis, uniting differing factions in the fight for the recognition of the 
Armenians’ long-denied trauma and survival. Now, with the violence of war once again 
threatening the Armenians in Syria, it would seem that Armenian communities are faced with yet 
another crisis around which to unite and mobilize. How will belonging to this nation unbounded 
by geographic space affect the mobility of Syrian Armenians when confronted with war at home 
in Syria? Will they move primarily within transnational Armenian spaces or will their movement 
be delineated by traditionally defined national boundaries? 
In my first chapter, I outline the organizing institutions and networks within the 
Armenian diaspora and discuss the diaspora’s links to the Republic of Armenia. We must note 
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that, while the diaspora refers to Armenian communities outside of Armenia, the transnation 
“includes all diasporic communities and the homeland… Thus the populations of the diaspora, of 
the Republic of Armenia, and of the Republic of (Nagorno- or Nagorny-) Karabagh1… are 
together considered the Armenian transnation” (Tölölyan 2000, 130-31, note 4). I begin my 
study of transnational Armenian institutions by examining the organization of Armenian 
communities under Ottoman dominion. Though Armenians in the Ottoman Empire lived within 
their historic homeland in Western Armenia,2 I characterize them as part of the Armenian 
diaspora as they had long existed as a minority under foreign rule. This understanding of 
Ottoman Armenian communities allows me to trace the evolution and persistence of Armenian 
diasporic institutions, beginning during a time when Armenians had no politically recognized 
homeland.3 
 
                          
 
 
Fig. 1. (Hewsen 
1997:3; Panossian 
2006:xviii) 
 
 
                                                
1 Nagorno-Karabagh is the disputed territory between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The territory is 
internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but a majority of the population is Armenian. 
2 Fig. 1 shows the historic Armenian homeland and the small portion that remains the Republic 
of Armenia. Western Armenia refers to the land in what is now eastern Turkey, to the west of the 
Republic of Armenia.  
3 While Western Armenia was ruled by the Ottoman Empire, Eastern Armenians fell within the 
Russian Empire. 
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My second chapter contextualizes the Armenian presence in Syria, particularly in 
Aleppo. Syrian Armenians are primarily the descendants of Ottoman Armenian refugees who 
fled the Armenian Genocide during World War I. In this chapter, I highlight some of the 
institutions discussed in Chapter I and how they persisted and were reestablished after the near 
destruction of the Armenian community. The construction of a post-genocide Armenian 
community in Syria serves as a case study of the institutional and organizational strength of the 
Armenian diaspora. Additionally, tracing the diasporic organizations that settled and developed 
in Syria with the Armenian refugees allows us to examine the transnational reach and 
participation of ordinary Syrian Armenians today. This inquiry into participation in transnational 
organizations then suggests how Syrian Armenians could move within transnational Armenian 
spaces as they attempt to flee the war in Syria. 
The third chapter brings me to the fundamental questions in this project. Having 
discussed the institutional structure and individual social networks within the Armenian 
transnation and having provided evidence of their role in ensuring Armenian survival in Syria, I 
seek to understand if and how these networks are mobilized today in the case of displaced Syrian 
Armenians. This chapter primarily relates the experiences of Syrian Armenian refugees who I 
have interviewed throughout the past year in an attempt to understand in what ways their 
experiences of war and migration have been shaped by diaspora and transnationality. 
I hope this project can shed some light more generally on the experience of diaspora and 
how the existential threat of exile and assimilation may be met with institutional organization 
and resistance. We may ask what came first – whether these institutions emerged in response to 
such a threat or if they existed already and needed only to be mobilized. In the case of Syria, I 
will discuss how the community responded to genocide with the construction of an institutionally 
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organized community. However, these institutions existed in the Ottoman Empire and the wider 
diaspora prior to the Genocide. Though they were damaged, the blueprint for nationalistic 
reconstruction existed. Had the Armenians not lived as diasporic, minority communities under 
Ottoman rule, would they have been equipped to rebuild as they did?  
Through the resilience of the Armenian nation, we see how a people can survive as a 
permanent diaspora – as a deterritorialized nation – maintaining itself through nationalism and 
strong institutional organization. I will explore whether these means of survival remain intact in 
today’s Armenian diaspora and if they serve to facilitate the forced migration of Syrian 
Armenians fleeing the war in Syria.  
 7 
Chapter I: Transnational Organization 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 (Knights & Daughters of Vartan 2017) 
 
The image above (Fig. 2) was circulating on social media in the week leading up to this 
year’s 102nd anniversary commemoration of the Armenian Genocide, observed yearly on April 
24th. What first struck me about the flyer was its assertion that “Every Armenian in the greater 
New York region needs to be a part of the annual commemoration of the Armenian Genocide in 
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New York City.” The flyer promotes participation in the event as a necessity for any Armenian 
for whom attendance is physically feasible. It calls on the reader’s identity – their membership of 
that imagined group that unites all who call themselves “Armenian.” As we see in this flyer, and 
will see throughout this project in discussions of Armenian philanthropy, national identity and 
membership carry with them responsibilities and obligations. Despite the contentious and at 
times violent divisions within Armenian communities, Armenians are expected and compelled to 
unite over shared trauma and survival. Politically, diasporic Armenians are encouraged to fight 
until justice is served and our governments recognize the suffering of our nation during the 
Genocide. 
Central to this chapter are the institutions through which these Armenians are expected to 
make their contributions. This poster represents the union of various spheres of transnational 
Armenian organization. Looking at the list of sponsors and participating organizations provides a 
preview of the institutional structure that I will discuss in this chapter. The credited groups 
include general NGOs, lobbies, political parties, branches of the Church, and social 
organizations. I will reference many of these groups specifically throughout the course of this 
chapter, and the organizations will fit more generally into the structures that I outline. 
Despite the Armenian and the international communities’ insistence on the Armenian 
Genocide as a defining national moment, it is important to note that the Armenian diaspora and 
the displacement to which it alludes far predate the genocide. By the time the Armenian 
communities of Turkey came under Ottoman rule, they had long been exiled from parts of their 
historic homeland. Acknowledging this long existing diaspora allows us to examine diasporic 
Armenian communities prior to the genocide and understand some of the institutional structures 
that sustained the survival of the Armenian people as a nation. Beginning any discussion of the 
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Armenian diaspora and its history with the Genocide fails to acknowledge and comprehend some 
of the very structures through which Armenians have ensured national survival. 
Strong institutional organization has been essential to the continued existence of an 
Armenian transnation. In this chapter, I outline the role and development of key institutions 
within the Armenian diaspora. Primarily, I discuss the importance of the millet system under the 
Ottoman Empire, and I highlight the organizational function of the Apostolic Church, political 
parties, and nongovernmental organizations since the 19th century. 
Looking to the history of the Armenian diaspora prior to the twentieth century provides 
insight into the complex institutional structures that persist within the transnation and that 
promote the survival of an Armenian national identity. I argue that, prior to the Armenian 
Genocide, the Armenian diaspora in the Ottoman Empire had strong institutions through the 
millet system and its parochial structure, providing a solid basis for the formation of institutions 
that would preserve Armenian nationality in newly formed diasporic communities after 1922. I 
expect that this tradition of strong institutional organization in the diaspora contributes to the 
effectiveness of transnational support for Syrian Armenians. 
As this chapter develops and addresses the current state of the diaspora, I will discuss the 
transnational spaces within which diasporic Armenians operate today. In a 2000 article, Khachig 
Tölölyan lists populations of Armenians in the diaspora as: 
Russia (nearly 2 million), the United States (800,000), Georgia (400,000), France 
(250,000), the Ukraine (150,000), Lebanon (105,000), Iran (ca. 100,000), Syria (70,000), 
Argentina (60,000), Turkey (60,000), Canada (40,0000, and Australia (30,000). There are 
some twenty other communities with smaller populations, ranging from 25,000 down to 
3,000, in Britain, Greece, Germany, Brazil, Sweden, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, the 
Gulf Emirates, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Venezuela, 
Hungary, Uzbekistan, and Ethiopia. (107) 
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In order to understand the context of Syrian Armenian migration during the war, we must 
consider the organizing principles of the diaspora and the strength of ties between disparate 
Armenian communities. We must consider to what extent the communities listed engage with the 
diaspora, with the homeland, and with one another. I posit that, despite threats of extermination 
and assimilation, Armenians have persisted as a nation through the strength of their local and 
transnational organization. For this reason, I will begin by discussing the structure of Armenian 
communities under Ottoman rule. 
 
The Millet 
In the Ottoman Empire, non-Muslim religious communities were organized and allowed 
a considerable degree of self-governance under the millet system. Through this system, the 
Armenian patriarchate was granted jurisdiction over Armenian communities4 in the Ottoman 
Empire and served as mediator between the community and the Ottoman government (Sanjian 
1965, 32). The strong organizational structure within the millet and the millet’s 
constitutionalization present key moments in the Armenian community’s transnational 
organization. 
 The Ottoman government established the millet around 1461 with the elected patriarch of 
Istanbul presiding over religious and civil issues (Sanjian 1985, 32-33; Tölölyan 2000, 117). 
“The patriarch, while subordinate in spiritual matters to the Catholicos of Echmiadzin and the 
Catholicos of Sis, was the independent head of the civil administration for members of his 
church in the Ottoman empire” (Davison 1963, 120). As the intermediary between the Ottoman 
                                                
4 The Armenian patriarchate was responsible for Orthodox monophysites, also including Syrian 
Jacobite, Coptic, and Abyssinian communities (Sanjian 1965: 33). 
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government and the millet, the patriarch ruled over the different bishoprics of the Armenian 
Church within the empire, and all Armenians were required to register marriages, births, deaths, 
and travel with the Ottoman bureaucracy through the patriarch. At this point in time, Armenians 
were already dispersed throughout the world, but the patriarchate of Istanbul ruled over the 
largest population of Armenians in the world (Sanjian 1985, 34). The organization of the 
Armenian millet under the Ottoman Empire, therefore, accounted for a major portion of the 
Armenian diaspora. 
 Under the millet system, any civil rights were dependent on enrollment in a recognized 
community. The organizational structure, therefore, was forced on many members of the 
community, and the Armenian ruling class could easily oppress the Armenian people. 
Additionally, the millet’s economic commitment to the sultan was not adjusted in the event that 
the community lost members. Thus, the patriarch strictly monitored the Armenian community in 
order to secure financial contributions (Sanjian 1965, 34). Within this system, the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy imposed what Middle East historian Roderic Davison (1963) describes as “legal and 
financial tyranny” (115). Armenian bankers and administrators conspired with the bureaucratic 
system to exploit of the Armenian community (Davison 1963, 118).  
In the 18th century, power over the Armenian millet began to shift from the Church to a 
group of aristocrats – bankers and government officials – who would be called amiras. The 
amiras wielded power over the patriarchate due to the millet’s financial dependence on their 
wealth. This created a more oligarchic system within the millet (Sanjian 1965, 36; Davison 1963, 
120). Armenian historian Avedis Sanjian (1965) writes, “In actual fact, they were more powerful 
than the officially recognized patriarch himself, who more often than not was their appointee. As 
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he was often called to office and deposed by the sultan on their recommendation, the patriarch 
could rarely take any step without their sanction” (36-7). 
Sanjian traces the beginning of democratization and constitutionalization of the millet to 
the patriarchal election of 1764, for which the amiras “[invited] a national assembly – consisting 
of ecclesiastics, chiefs of the trade guilds, intellectuals, and leaders of the common people of the 
capital, more than one thousand individuals in all – to ratify their choice” (37). However, Sanjian 
(1965) claims, “The real challenge to the absolute rule of the amiras began in the late 1830’s” 
with what became a populist “anti-amira movement” (37-8). This movement marks the 
beginning of a transition to a more democratic and constitutional system.  
Davison (1963) argues that a dispute over the establishment of an Armenian college in 
1838 caused a rift within the amiras that allowed an opening for the artisans. The amiras were 
split, with “the sarraf’s, or moneylenders, bankers, and great merchant” on one side and 
“Armenian notables who held such official Ottoman posts as imperial architect, director of the 
mint, and superintendent of the imperial powder works” on the other (Davison 1963, 120). 
Siding with the notables, the artisans took advantage of the divided amira class but struggled 
financially without the support of the bankers (Davison 1963, 120). Through this populist 
movement, the artisan class was able to secure popular rule through an edict, but failed to 
effectively govern. Sanjian (1965) writes, “it soon became apparent, however, that the artisans 
lacked the competence and constitutional powers to make a popular administration effective” 
(39). Though the artisans gave up their council, the movement had success in disseminating a 
strong desire for popular rule, leading to a new council formed by the patriarch in 1844, half 
bankers and half artisans, “to share with the patriarch the administrative and executive functions 
of the millet” (Sanjian 1965, 39; Davison 1963, 121). In the next few years, further 
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democratically elected councils were established under the patriarch to handle the administration 
of different sectors of community life. Sanjian signals the creation of these councils and the 
increasingly complex governing system as the beginning of constitutional government within the 
Armenian millet. He writes, “This growing administrative machinery accentuated the need for 
defining the rights and obligations and the mutual relations of the various bodies; in short, the 
need was urgently felt for a comprehensive written constitution” (39). However, even before the 
introduction of a written constitution, the intricacy of the Armenian diaspora’s organization 
under Ottoman rule is evident. 
Between 1860 and 1865, the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire led to a 
reorganization of the millets’ administration and the adoption of constitutions as part of this 
reorganization process. These reforms led to a move away from religious administration of the 
non-Muslim communities and toward a more secular system for the millets (Davison 1963, 114). 
Davison (1963) argues that a most pressing aim of these reforms was to detach the millets from 
foreign intervention. The minority religious communities found their counterparts in European 
powers, which were compelled to interfere on behalf of their religious communities. Further, by 
distancing the millets from their religious allegiances, Davison believes the Tanzimat intended to 
create unity surrounding Ottoman identity rather than preserving the religious divides previously 
emphasized by the millet system (115). However, Davison (1963) argues that the reforms 
ultimately had the opposite effect. Because they focused on reforming the millets, which were 
fundamentally defined by distinct religious identity, the Tanzimat effectively reinforced divided 
Ottoman identity rather than unifying. Further, Davison (1963) claims the secular philosophy 
that made its way into the education system expedited the spread of nationalist sentiment within 
the millet (132). 
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Returning specifically to the Armenian context, the Tanzimat drove further 
constitutionalization of the Armenian millet, which, Sanjian (1965) claims, was the first 
community to pass its own written constitution utilizing the reforms passed in the Tanzimat (39). 
In reference to the protests that arose within the artisan class, Davison (1963) writes, “It was in 
the Armenian millet that the reform movement first spread extensively, and here also that the 
most significant changes were achieved within the elaboration of a written constitution” (120). 
After more conservative factions within the community rejected the first two drafts, a diverse 
assembly approved the constitution on May 24, 1860. However, the Ottoman government did not 
ratify the constitution, thus putting the laws into effect, until March 1863, after forming its own 
committee of Armenians to revise the 1860 constitution (Sanjian 1965, 40). Through the 
constitution, Sanjian (1965) states, “it was emphasized that the foundation of representative 
government rested on the principle of mutual rights and obligations, on the principle of equity, 
and that such a government derived its authority from a consensus of the majority” (41).  
The sophisticated administrative structure established by the Armenian millet’s 
constitution is key to my understanding of the Armenian diaspora and its ability to survive 
through its highly organized institutional structures. “The ninety-nine articles of the constitution 
established the machinery for a very elaborate system of organization and administration of the 
millet’s ecclesiastical and civil affairs on the central, provincial, and local levels” (Sanjian 1965, 
41). The intricate organizational structure seen in the Armenian millet demonstrates the 
community’s ability to organize and manage its own affairs under the dominant governing 
power. In fact, Davison (1963) claims that the Ottoman constitution of 1876 “was directly 
influenced by the Armenians” (134). Given the complex institutional system established within 
Armenian communities in the Ottoman Empire, it should not be surprising that the community 
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was able to organize under new host governments after the dispersal caused by the Armenian 
Genocide. 
On the importance on the constitution, Sanjian (1965) argues, “Without a doubt, the 
Armenian National Constitution is a document of more than usual historical significance from 
the standpoint both of the development of the Ottoman millet system and of its truly great impact 
on the growth of the Armenian social institutions and communities throughout the Turkish 
dominions” (40). I will go on to discuss various key social institutions within the Armenian 
diaspora, many of which I believe can be traced to the institutions of Ottoman Armenians. 
 
The Church5 
 In this discussion of the millet, the Church’s central role in organizing the Armenian 
community is clear. Even though the Tanzimat significantly secularized the millet, its religious 
organization remained important. The role of the patriarch, who was the head of both religious 
and civil administration for the entire millet, diminished after constitutionalization but did not 
vanish. The structure of the patriarchate and the religious councils remained, though the 
reorganization left them under the authority of the representative general assembly (Davison 
1963, 124). Sanjian (1965) writes:  
The constitution of 1863 vested the highest legislative authority in a representative 
general assembly composed of 140 deputies: twenty ecclesiastics elected by the clergy of 
the capital, forty lay deputies from the provinces including bishoprics under the spiritual 
authority of the regional sees, and eighty lay deputies from the parishes of Constantinople 
and its suburbs. (41).  
 
                                                
5 Though a majority of Armenians belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church, around which this 
section revolves, it is important to note that not all Armenians are Apostolic. There are 
significant minorities of Armenians practicing Catholicism and Protestantism. 
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Though the Armenian community throughout the Ottoman Empire elected the lay deputies, the 
governing system was still deeply intertwined with the Apostolic Church, which was represented 
by ecclesiastics in the assembly. Among other administrative duties, the assembly established 
through the constitution was responsible for “the election of the patriarchs of Constantinople and 
Jerusalem” (Sanjian 1965, 41). In addition to the legislative assembly, there were two primary 
councils to handle the executive authority over Armenian communities on the level of central 
administration (Sanjian 1965, 42). One of these councils was religious and the other civil, again 
demonstrating the importance of the Church in the administration of the millet. 
 Beyond its role in government, however, the Church has its own sophisticated structure 
and network. The organization and hierarchy within the Church can be seen through its division 
into various patriarchates, catholicosates, and bishoprics, with the unique jurisdictions of the 
Catholicosate of Cilicia, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. 
Further describing the Church’s structure today, Khachig Tölölyan (2000) writes: 
A transnational organization such as the Armenian Apostolic Church marks the duality of 
its concerns by a duality of personnel and structures. Its married priests serve local 
parishes for decades… The celibate priesthood acts as a mobile religious bureaucracy of 
robed executives; they serve as a transnational cadre, characteristically moving from one 
post to another. Bishops aspiring to the top positions of the diasporic church must 
typically serve in communities in both the Middle East and North America. (114) 
 
The structure and hierarchy within the Church are evident. Further, the importance of serving in 
disparate communities prior to reaching top positions within the Church shows the Church’s 
emphasis on transnational operation and organization. Though religion has not been the only 
unifying force for diasporic Armenians, the importance of the Church as an institution within 
transnational Armenian spaces is clear. 
 In many diasporic Armenian communities a whole host of elements play into Armenian 
identity. William Safran (1991) writes, “Armenian ethnicity and the solidarity of the Armenian 
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community are based on a common religion and language, a collective memory of national 
independence in a circumscribed territory, and a remembrance of betrayal, persecution, and 
genocide… most Armenians live outside the ancestral homeland and have developed several 
external centers of religion and culture” (84). Political activity for Armenians has revolved 
largely around this issue of “remembrance of… genocide.” However, under circumstances where 
such political engagement is suppressed, religion takes a more significant role in the Armenian 
community. Tölölyan (2000) explains, “In host states where Armenian diasporic activity of any 
sort is forbidden and punished by imprisonment or worse, such as Turkey, diasporic life becomes 
primarily religious” (128). 
 The Church’s involvement in Armenian communities throughout the diaspora serves as 
both an organizing and a unifying force for diasporic Armenians. In many of these communities, 
religious centers serve also as general cultural centers. For example, as a child I attended 
Armenian school on Friday nights, where I learned to read and write and engage with Armenian 
culture. Though Armenian school involved little religious engagement and my immediate family 
was not religious, I attended these classes in an Armenian Church. Further, because of its joint 
local and transnational organization, the Church provides a link between isolated Armenian 
communities and the global Armenian diaspora. 
 
Political Parties 
The political parties that still exist and organize Armenian communities today began as 
revolutionary parties in the second half of the nineteenth century. Today the primary parties 
remain the Hunchakian, Ramkavar, and Dashnaktsuthiun Parties. Despite tension between the 
conflicting political parties, the transnational operation of these parties links Armenians 
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throughout the diaspora and emphasizes participation in diasporic politics in addition to or 
instead of local politics. The organization of these parties contributes further to the 
organizational strength of the diaspora and the preservation of transnational ties. 
 The first of these revolutionary parties was the Armenakan Party, formed in Van in 1885. 
The party was founded by students of exiled Armenian educator Mekertitch Portugalian and 
inspired by his journal Armenia, published from France (Nalbandian 1963, 96). The journal 
would also become an active medium for communicating the party’s ideas, as noted in the 
party’s organizing document. This document, called the Program, contained seven detailed 
sections outlining the group’s organization and objectives. The party was organized into districts 
which were represented in a Central Body and locally had committees representing different 
groups within the district. The organization also consisted of both active and auxiliary members. 
“Active members were those who paid dues and complied with the rules and regulations of the 
party. Auxiliary members were those who gave moral and financial support, but were not 
obligated to comply with party rules and regulations” (Nalbandian 1963, 98). Of the financial 
contributions from active members within the Ottoman Empire, 15% was distributed to the 
Central Body and 15% to District Committees. Members abroad had 40% of the their dues 
designated to the Central Body (Nalbandian 1963, 98). 
 The Armenakans activities focused largely on preparing for revolution, as “They believed 
that much preliminary work had to be accomplished for this future revolution and that an 
immediate revolution was not desirable” (Nalbandian 1963, 99). A large part of this preparation 
consisted of an educational project emphasizing cultural, political, and particularly military 
training. Van served as the center for these activities, and the party established branches in 
 19 
“Moush, Bitlis, Trebizond, and Constantinople. There were other Armenakan organizations in 
Persia, in Russian Transcaucasia, and in the United States” (Nalbandian 1963, 99). 
Thus, we see the transnational impact of Armenian political parties dating back to the 
first revolutionary party in the 19th century. With the publication of Armenakan ideas in France 
and the operation of the organization from the Middle East, to the Russian Empire, to the United 
States, the party served as a link between diasporic Armenian communities. However, relative to 
the Hunchakian and the Dashnaktsuthiun Parties, the Armenakan Party’s influence lacked 
transnational reach. Historian Louise Nalbandian (1963) writes, “Having less contact with the 
outside world, the leaders of the Armenakan Party were not versed as were the leaders of the 
other parties, in the socioeconomic theories of the day, nor did they advocate socialist principles. 
As a party they remained localized and accordingly lacked the broad appeal and the strength” of 
the other two parties (182). Examining these parties that remain central institutions today allows 
us to further understand the formal organization of diasporic Armenians. 
 The Hunchakian Revolutionary Party was founded in Geneva in 1887 by Russian 
Armenian Marxists who were “personally concerned with the living conditions of their ethnic 
brothers in Turkish Armenia” (Nalbandian 1963, 104). Like Armenakan, the Hunchakian Party 
was influenced by the journal Armenia, which inspired wealthy Russian Armenian students in 
Western Europe to come together and found the party. Of the creation of the Hunchakian Party, 
Nalbandian (1963) writes, “In contrast to the Armenakan Party, the six Armenian students whose 
headquarters was in Geneva had in mind designs for a large, powerful, active revolutionary party 
that would encompass the whole territory of Turkish Armenia and would have branches in the 
Armenian communities abroad” (107). After failing to gain support from Portugalian and thus 
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Armenia, the leaders of the new Hunchakian Party created their own publication, Hunchak, to 
begin the dissemination of their own revolutionary ideas (Nalbandian 1963, 107). 
 In their program, the Hunchaks outline the party’s goals, methods, and organizing 
principles. Primary objectives for the party included a new system built upon socialism and the 
independence of Turkish Armenia. Of the former, Nalbandian (1963) writes, “The present state 
of affairs had to be destroyed by means of a revolution. Then, on the ashes of the old society, a 
new one might be built, based upon ‘economic truths’ and ‘socialistic justice’” (108) Regarding 
independence, Nalbandian (1963) writes that the Hunchak program described Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire as exploited by “the government, the aristocracy, and the capitalists through 
high taxes, land seizure, and the deprivation of the fruits of labor. Besides these injustices, the 
people were shorn of their political rights and were forced to remain silent in their position as 
slaves of their parasitic overlords”  (108). The solution according to the Hunchak program was to 
guide Turkish Armenians in the fight for socialism and an independent nation. The approach of 
the Hunchakian Party was clear: revolution. More specifically, “The Hunchaks said that the 
existing social organization in Turkish Armenia could be changed by violence against the 
Turkish government and described the following methods: Propaganda, Agitation, Terror, 
Organization, and Peasant and Worker Activities” (Nalbandian 1963, 110). 
 Though the Hunchaks’ socialist ideology faced resistance from wealthy Armenians in 
both the Ottoman and Russian Empires, they saw great success as they set out to recruit members 
from their Turkish headquarters in Constantinople. They recruited 700 members in their first 
seven months in the city. Membership then quickly grew in Turkey, Russia, and Persia, and the 
organization gained support in Europe and the United States as well (Nalbandian 1963, 117). An 
independent Armenia presented a unifying aspiration for many diasporic Armenians. Thus, with 
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strong communication and organization, revolutionary parties had the opportunity to forge solid 
transnational networks. These dispersed supporters of the party came together in 1890 when, 
“the union of the separate groups resulted in the adoption of the party’s official name, the 
Hunchakian Revolutionary Party” (Nalbandian 1963, 117). 
 Though the Hunchaks remain active today, the Dashnaktsuthiun Party has remained even 
more influential. In the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s, a number of revolutionary groups operated on a 
small scale throughout the Russian Empire. In 1890 these groups came together to form 
Dashnaktsuthiun, formally the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Nalbandian 1963, 150-51). 
The Hunchaks also briefly united with the Dashnaks in 1890 (Nalbandian 1963, 130). Like the 
Hunchaks, the Dashnaktsuthiun Party’s membership can be divided into “nonsocialist nationalist 
revolutionaries” and “Armenian socialist revolutionaries” (Nalbandian 1963, 152). 
Regarding the parties continued influence, Tölölyan (2000) writes, “the largest and 
second-oldest political organization in the diaspora, the ARF [Dashnaktsuthiun], has branches 
that work in numerous spheres of quotidian diasporic life and has always had many intellectuals 
in its leadership and ranks… several past members and one present member of the ARF Bureau, 
which leads the global organization, have also been writers, and many more have been editors of 
the newspapers this organization funds” (128). The party sponsored publications to which 
Tölölyan refers further demonstrate the extensive transnational influence of these diasporic 
parties. All three of the active political parties today have newspapers, TV channels, and radio 
stations throughout the transnation. The party publications are mostly based out of the United 
State, Canada, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Armenia. 
The third active Armenian party, in addition to Hunchak and Dashnak, formed slightly 
later. The Ramkavar, or Armenian Democratic Liberal, Party “formed in 1921 by the triple 
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merger of the Armenakan, of a splinter of the Hunchaks, and the Sahmanadir Ramkavar party 
founded in Cairo in 1908” (Migliorino 2008, 56). 
All three parties were banned from the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, but upon 
independence in 1991, the Dashnaktsuthiun, Hunchakian, and Ramkavar parties all returned to 
Armenia and attempted to gain political influence. Tölölyan (2000) writes that, “Funded by the 
diaspora, these organizations—and especially the ARF [Dashnaktsuthiun]—were able to 
establish offices, start recruiting members, publish newspapers, and run (initially largely 
unsuccessful) candidates for public office, competing with the local, post-Soviet leadership” 
(123). At the end of the 20th century, these parties remained influential throughout the diaspora. 
Through the parties, diasporic Armenians engage in transnational diasporic politics and attempt 
to influence their national center. 
Despite the important links that the political parties create between different Armenian 
communities, it is also important to recognize the strong divisions that the parties create within 
the transnation. As Tölölyan (2000) notes, “the transnation’s different segments, though 
temporarily united by crisis, do not share the same political goals and principles” (123). 
Particularly strong enmity between the parties comes up within the Syrian context; therefore, I 
will discuss this topic further in the second chapter.  
 
NGOs 
 There are a number of Armenian NGOs operating either on the local level within 
Armenian communities, on the transnational level within the diaspora, or both. The largest 
Armenian transnational organization is the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), 
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founded in 1906, which has an endowment of $300 million (Tölölyan 2000, 127; AGBU 2017). 
The AGBU’s mission statement reads:  
The Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) is the world’s largest non-profit 
organization devoted to upholding the Armenian heritage through educational, cultural 
and humanitarian programs. Each year, AGBU is committed to making a difference in 
the lives of 500,000 people across Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian 
diaspora… 
AGBU currently operates with an annual budget of over $46 million, made possible by 
our countless benefactors. Headquartered in New York City, AGBU has an active 
presence in 31 countries and 74 cities and addresses the needs of Armenians with 
traditional and progressive programs worldwide —from schools, scouts, camps and 
support for the arts to internships, virtual learning and young professional networks. 
(AGBU 2017). 
 
AGBU plays an important role in creating a social and cultural center in Armenian communities 
throughout the world as well as engaging transnationally in projects for the advancement of 
Armenians. As mentioned in their mission statement, AGBU has fulltime private schools in 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Greece, Uruguay, three in Lebanon, two in Syria, and 3 in the 
United States (“Schools” 2017). They also have scouting troops throughout the transnation, thus 
engaging diasporic Armenians in Armenian culture and nationalism. 
 Homenetmen, officially The Armenian General Athletic Union and Scouts, similarly 
connects diasporic Armenian youth with Armenianness. The organization was originally 
established in 1918 in Constantinople, then dispersed in 1922 and reopened in Beirut and Aleppo 
in 1924 and 1925 (Asbarez 2006). Like AGBU, it now operates chapters around the world. These 
institutions promote the cultural survival of the Armenian transnation, but also establish a 
concrete institutional link between isolated Armenian communities. As I will mention in my 
third chapter, Armenians relocating to distant, seemingly disconnected communities may find 
themselves engaged in a familiar transnational space through participation in AGBU or 
Homenetmen, both of which can be traced back to Ottoman Armenians. 
 24 
 In addition to these major transnational organizations, smaller organizations also operate 
throughout the diaspora. Tölölyan (2000) mentions, for example, the Zoryan Institute, which is 
based out of Massachusetts and Toronto. He refers to these as “tiny independent organizations 
active in some region of the transnation, like the Zoryan Institute, whose cultural contributions 
include the origination of the journal Diaspora” (Tölölyan 2000, 127). In additional to cultural 
organizations, there are many Armenian humanitarian organization. Some of these will be 
referenced more specifically in the next section in relation to diasporic humanitarian involvement 
in post-Soviet Armenia, and I will discuss others in chapter 3 concerning the war in Syria. 
 A major focus of the transnational Armenian community, however, has been political 
recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Many Armenian organizations center the Armenian 
Genocide in their work and in Armenian identity. In the United States, we see the institutional 
strength of Armenian organization through two primary lobbying organizations. “The Armenian 
Assembly of America and the Armenian National Committee of America [are] the two 
successful Armenian-American lobbies operating in Washington, DC” (Tölölyan 2000, 128). 
These organizations, of course, do not focus solely on genocide recognition, but the emphasis 
does seem disproportionate. It will be interesting to examine how Armenian lobbies in the 
United States have responded to the crisis in Syria, where one of the oldest and largest Armenian 
communities has been threatened by war. Payaslian (2010) writes, “Diasporan organizations, led 
by the Armenian National Committee of America and the Armenian Assembly, for example, 
have lobbied extensively since the 1970s for U.S. genocide recognition, and issues concerning 
the republic were added beginning in 1988” (131). As we will see in the next section, the failing 
economic and social conditions in the Republic of Armenia provided another crisis around which 
the global diaspora would unite. 
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 Though some of these organizations are primarily transnational and some are primarily 
local, even the transnational organizations have major local foci. Tölölyan (2000) writes of the 
importance of local involvement for transnational institutions, claiming, “In general, and 
paradoxically, the more successful a transnational diasporic organization is, the more it is likely 
to have developed local branches and services” (114). AGBU and Homenetmen are first and 
foremost transnational organizations, but their local engagement is evident. Their schools and 
youth groups connect Armenians to the transnation, but they are clearly ingrained in their local 
communities. 
 
Ties to Armenia 
Links between Armenian diaspora communities throughout the world and the Republic of 
Armenia further demonstrate the structure of the Armenian transnation. In many ways the 
connection between diasporic Armenians and Yerevan is purely a symbolic, nationalistic bond. 
However, the institutionalization of this bond through NGOs and government agencies and its 
concretization through decades of migration transform the Republic of Armenia into a solid 
center of gravity for the Armenian diaspora. That is to say, concrete connections did not exist 
between the diaspora and Armenia until people began to act out of nationalism and forge social 
and economic networks. 
Emphasizing the symbolic connection between diasporic Armenians and the Republic of 
Armenia, Payaslian (2010) writes, “Despite the difficulties, post-Soviet Armenia represents the 
current ‘spiritual homeland’ for most Armenians, although the historic homeland now in Turkey 
continues to survive, albeit all too vaguely, in the nation’s collective memory” (133). However, 
for many Armenians in the diaspora, the connection to the homeland is weakened. Armenia for 
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many diasporans exists not in the republic but within the transnational space that I have 
referenced in the previous sections. Payaslian (2010) argues that, for third and fourth generation 
diasporic Armenians, “The imagined homeland, now rendered foreign, is kept at a comfortable 
distance, a destination to be visited at leisure and a place to dispatch charity” (134). 
However, despite the symbolic nature of Armenia as a homeland, the country also makes 
up part of a more concrete transnational network. Immigration, or repatriation, creates real social 
and familial ties between the republic and the diaspora. In his Ph.D. dissertation, historian Sevan 
Yousefian (2011) discusses a 1945 resolution in which the Soviet government in Moscow 
declares its support for Armenian repatriation. He writes, “Between 1946 and early 1949, tens of 
thousands of Armenians from the Near East, Europe, and North America would settle in the 
[Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic]… The majority were refugees who had fled the Ottoman 
Empire during World War I and their children, and a significant minority came from Armenian-
populated villages in towns in Iran” (2). 
I came across this period of mass migration during my own interviews with Syrian 
Armenians, as I tried to understand why these Western Armenians6, with no historical 
geographical ties to Armenia, felt such a connection to the republic. A Syrian Armenian told me 
that his aunt and her family were persuaded along with many other Armenians to move to the 
USSR to increase the Armenian population and prevent the USSR from combining Armenians 
into another, non-Armenian, state. Another Syrian Armenian provided a similar narrative. He 
explained that Armenians in the USSR faced the threat of becoming an autonomous region rather 
than a Soviet Republic. He said there was a “call for Armenians to return” and that “they were 
promised paradise, but many ended up in Siberia.” The sense of Armenian nationalism that 
                                                
6 Refers to Armenians from Western Armenia – now eastern Turkey. For map of the historic 
Armenian homeland, see Fig. 2 on page 4. 
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unified diasporic Armenians during the formation of the revolutionary parties comes into play 
again here. However, this migration that initially just represents Armenian nationalism, a purely 
abstract relationship between the diaspora and Armenia, creates a concrete kinship connection, as 
individual families now exist within the transnational space joining diaspora and symbolic 
homeland. 
In the last couple decades, the idea of repatriation has been emphasized in Armenia as a 
way to connect diasporans to the homeland and to support the economic development of the 
republic. As the Armenian Parliament discussed possible dual-citizenship laws in 2007, political 
scientist Anna Ohanyan (2004) considered the possible variants of such a law and what it should 
accomplish. She writes, “dual citizenship should be considered a mechanism to expand the 
global reach of Armenian statehood geographically, economically, and politically” (281). This 
objective suggests not only an emphasis on ‘return’ migration, but also the idea of transnational 
“statehood.” Ohanyan emphasizes the importance of transnational Armenian participation in the 
goings on of the homeland. 
This transnational engagement in the homeland can be seen in the diaspora’s 
humanitarian interest and participation in post-Soviet Armenia. Ohanyan (2004) discusses the 
failures of post-Soviet Armenia to meet the social needs and rights of its citizens, as “rapid 
economic liberalization and privatization have progressed, producing unemployment and 
poverty” (282). The other side of this failure once again elicits the nationalism of the diaspora 
and deepens transnational Armenian networks. Ohanyan (2004) writes: 
Parallel to these developments in the Republic of Armenia, the large Armenian Diaspora, 
both ‘old’ and ‘new,’ is emerging as a stable source of social provision to many 
communities inside the country. In doing so, and by carrying out on a limited scale social 
obligations that until recently belonged to the state, the diaspora is becoming a major 
transnational player affecting state–society relationships in Armenia; its impact is 
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captured by capital inflows in the form of remittances, diaspora-connected foreign direct 
investments, and philanthropic contributions. (283) 
 
The diaspora’s investment in Armenia that Ohanyan describes also came up in my interviews 
with Syrian Armenians. A business owner in California informed me that in 1994, when 
economic conditions in the Republic of Armenia were particularly desperate, he felt obligated to 
open offices for his company in Armenia as an investment in Armenian development. 
 Diaspora involvement has been a major contributor to the survival of post-Soviet 
Armenia. This involvement created a significant tie between the diaspora and the republic 
beginning in 1988, prior to independence. Military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and 
an earthquake during that year turned the diaspora’s engagement towards the homeland 
(Payaslian 2010, 130). Payaslian (2010) argues, “The rapid and massive response in technical 
and material aid to the earthquake of December 1988 demonstrated the attachment that diasporan 
Armenians felt or hoped to feel toward Armenia” (131). The need for diaspora involvement only 
increased with the subsequent economic failure and need for development that accompanied 
independence in 1991. As I briefly noted in the previous section, at this point Armenian lobbies 
in the United States also began to work for economic development and humanitarian aid in the 
Republic of Armenia (Payaslian 2010, 131). As Ohanyan (2004) states, “Transnational non-state 
actors, such as international developmental and humanitarian organizations, diaspora NGOs, and 
individuals, have all been actively involved in Armenia, seeking to develop projects in different 
sectors, including agricultural development, reforestation, and health care” (283). Financially, 
Ohanyan (2004) cites reports that in 2003 over 20% of Armenia’s GDP came from remittances 
from the diaspora (283). 
 American Armenian businessman Kirk Kerkorian and his Lincy Foundation are one 
example of private diasporic engagement in homeland development. Of Kerkorian’s charitable 
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foundation, Ohanyan (2004) writes, “In 2005, the US-based Lincy Foundation allocated $60 
million for three infrastructure projects… This commitment [followed] Lincy’s successful 
completion of a $150-million infrastructure renovation project… In addition, the Lincy 
Foundation provided $20 million in loans to small and medium-sized enterprises in Armenia” 
(283). Though he was born in the United States, Kerkorian has become an important 
philanthropic figure within the Armenian diaspora. In this case, the Lincy Foundation’s projects 
in Armenia demonstrate commitment within the diaspora to the symbolic homeland and to both 
utilize and establish networks between Armenia and the diaspora. 
 On the other side, the Hayastan All-Armenian Fund was established by the Armenian 
president in 1992 in order to raise money from the diaspora and support development in 
Armenia. According to its website, “It is a unique institution whose mission is to unite 
Armenians in Armenia and overseas to overcome the country’s difficulties and to help establish 
sustainable development in Armenia and Artsakh” (Hayastan All Armenian Fund 2017). The 
fund “spent approximately US$75 million on 138 different infrastructure projects in Armenia 
and Nagorno Karabagh in the first ten years of its operations” (Ohanyan 2004, 283). Then, 
further establishing Armenia’s attempt to connect with and benefit from the diaspora, the 
republic established the Ministry of Diaspora in 2008 in order to support “the Armenia-Diaspora 
partnership.” The ministry’s mission statement claims: 
The main objective of the Armenia-Diaspora partnership is to protect the fundamental 
rights, liberties and legal interests of Armenians in the historical Homeland or abroad… 
to defend the qualities of Armenian national identity, that is, preservation of Armenian 
identity… 
 
The Ministry also contributes to the implementation of educational projects… 
 
The Ministry assists in the participation of Diaspora Armenian entrepreneurs in economic 
projects in the Republic of Armenia... One of the most significant objectives of the 
Ministry is to promote the self-organization of the disorganized sector of the Diaspora… 
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as well as the creation and application of clear and specific procedures for Diaspora 
Armenians to obtain dual citizenship. (RA Ministry of Diaspora 2016) 
 
Like the Church, NGOs, and political parties, this government institution is concerned with the 
preservation of Armenianness throughout the world. The Ministry of Diaspora actively works to 
create links between Armenia and the diaspora, even among those, it seems, who do not strongly 
identify with Armenia, as the mission also promotes “establishment and radicalization of 
Armenian identity among [foreign] Armenians” (RA Ministry of Diaspora 2016). Further, the 
mission statement demonstrates the Armenian government’s interest in an organized diaspora, 
the importance of which I have been addressing throughout this chapter. 
 Also referenced in the above mission statement is the focus on “repatriation of Diaspora 
Armenians.” Though Payaslian (2010) claims that “Only a small number of enterprising 
adventurers chose to migrate to Armenia” (134), this trend seems to be slowly increasing. In an 
article in which she discusses this phenomenon of “return” to the homeland and interviews some 
of these “adventurers,” Sossie Kasbarian (2009) refers to these migrants as sojourners. She 
writes, “Sojourners embody transnational existence, acting as a bridge between the ‘step-
homeland’ and the diaspora, as well as being the physical embodiment of their encounter” 
(Kasbarian 2009, 376). As I discussed in reference to previous generations of migrants, these 
diasporic Armenians choose to repatriate and reinforce networks between the republic and the 
diaspora. 
 Like the migrants of 1945-1948, current repatriates are motivated by nationalism and 
have the effects of solidifying transnational bonds. Kasbarian (2009) argues, “The Republic of 
Armenia is viewed as the seat of contemporary and future Armenianness, and the long-term 
sojourners are therefore trying, to varying extents, to experience, embrace, align themselves 
with, and shape this version” (376). However, repatriates experience major cultural differences 
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between Armenia and their diasporic communities. Yet, from her interviews Kasbarian (2009) 
concludes, “Some of the sojourners have long-term goals: ‘I may not be completely at home here 
but I know my children will be’ (Minas, Lebanese Armenian)” (376). This desire to pass on 
Armenian identity to their children makes up a large part of the nationalism that has kept 
Armenia alive in diaspora.  
Since Kasbarian’s article on “sojourners,” the NGO Repat Armenia has emerged as a 
major player in the repatriation movement. Repat Armenia was founded in 2012 with the aim to 
“Inform, initiate and actively champion the return of high-impact (professional, entrepreneurial) 
individuals and families to Armenia to secure the future development of the Armenian nation” 
(Repat Armenia Foundation 2016). The group encourages repatriation among diasporic 
Armenians and supports the integration process for those who decide to immigrate. They claim: 
For those who are considering a move to Armenia, we offer one-on-one consultations, 
networking opportunities during informal monthly events and to connect you to the 
Armenian Repatriates Network. We also assist you with introducing you to professional 
services providers that can help you with employment, setting up a business or other 
aspects of integration. We are here to help you! 
 
With the passage of the dual citizenship law 2007, allowing these repatriates to apply for 
Armenian citizenship, links between Armenia and the diaspora continue to grow stronger. A few 
Armenian American repatriates that I spoke to in Yerevan explained the responsibility they felt 
to support their homeland’s development by moving and working in Armenia. Several of these 
individuals had come for short-term internships arranged through the Birthright Armenia 
program and then decided to stay and work. 
 However, despite the appearance of strengthening networks between the diaspora and 
Armenia, Payaslian (2010) argues, “The American Armenian community’s inability to address 
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the problems in Armenia has clearly indicated that the diaspora and the homeland are indeed two 
separate entities, each with its own, and often conflicting, interests and priorities” (131-32). 
He then ends more optimistically, “On the positive side, it is possible that an independent 
Armenia can re-connect some future generations of diasporan Armenians with the homeland 
even if in its territorially truncated form” (Payaslian 2010, 134). Despite differences and 
conflicting objectives within the diaspora and the Republic of Armenia, the history of migration 
and humanitarian involvement, both by NGOs and individual diasporans, has created a 
transnational network connecting Armenians across the globe. 
 
 All of the institutions outlined in this chapter have created transnational ties between 
geographically isolated Armenian communities. In the rest of this project, I will explore the role 
these institution play in preserving Armenian identity and their effectiveness in uniting the 
transnation. I will look first at the aftermath of the Armenian Genocide in Syria, and then I will 
examine the impact of transnationality on current Syrian Armenians as they flee war in Syria.  
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Chapter II: Syrian ‘Armenia’ 
 
My interviewees have emphasized to me the importance of the Armenian community in 
Aleppo as a first major post-genocide Armenian community, kaghut. They have explained to me 
that this diasporic community must be preserved due to its special status, one that it achieved as 
the first major stop along deportation routes during the Armenian Genocide. I have heard that 
some diasporic Armenians in Los Angeles have gone so far as to argue that Armenians should 
not be leaving Syria during the war, though those I interviewed generally disagreed with this 
stance and recognized the privilege in making such an argument from the comforts of life in the 
United States. 
 The development of Armenian communities in Syria post-Genocide provides a case 
study for my argument in Chapter I and contextualizes the presence of Armenian communities 
and institutions in Syria for Chapter III. Nicola Migliorino (2006) argues, “throughout the nine 
decades after the genocide, the Armenian determination to maintain a distinct communal cultural 
identity has remained one of the key defining traits of their presence in Syria, almost a 
communal ‘mission’” (para. 8). How did Armenian refugees in Syria after 1915 avoid 
assimilation in order to preserve national identity, and what role did existing institutions play in 
reestablishing Armenian culture and community? And, how did present day Armenian 
communities fit into Syrian society prior to 2011?  
  
Establishing a Post-Genocide Armenian Community in Mandatory Syria  
Like the Syrian Armenians that I interviewed, historian Keith Watenpaugh (2006) 
references Aleppo’s position along the displacement route, citing a 1923 estimate by the French 
Mandate government. This evaluation quotes that roughly 200,000 Armenians passed through 
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Aleppo as they fled Anatolia, with 75,000 settling in the province of Aleppo and 50,000 settling 
in Aleppo proper (Watenpaugh 2006:281, note 5). Watenpaugh (2006) writes, “The vast bulk of 
these displaced individuals—more than 50,000—found refuge in and around Aleppo, altering it 
forever… The ambiguous and vulnerable status of the Armenians in Syria forced community 
representatives and leaders to mobilize political and cultural resources and to accept 
governmental and nongovernmental, paternal, albeit often-altruistic aid to survive” (281). I will 
examine how this Armenian community in Syria managed to reestablish Armenian diasporic life 
after displacement, tracing the institutions that I discussed in Chapter I and acknowledging the 
role of the “paternal” aid that Watenpaugh discusses. 
Setting up his analysis of the relationship between Armenian refugees in Syria and the 
French mandate, Watenpaugh (2006) asks questions that have arisen in my own project as well: 
How did the Ottoman Armenians, a community with a history of complex objective 
institutions, including religious hierarchies, political formations of both the Right and 
Left, middle-class social and philanthropic organizations, and youth movements like the 
Boy and Girl Scouts, re-create these institutions in a transnational diaspora and colonial 
context? Moreover, does a parallel exist between the way the Armenian community of 
Syria sought to build a relationship with the French and the modes of communal 
cooperation between Armenians and the prewar Ottoman state? (282) 
 
He focuses primarily on the second question and the relationship between Armenian refugees 
and European powers in Syria. Neglecting to focus on the function of “complex objective 
[Armenian] institutions,” Watenpaugh argues for the role of Armenian cooperation with the 
French and with foreign missionaries as a primary reason for national survival. These foreign 
interests played an important role in supporting the reconstruction of Armenian community life 
in Syria; therefore, I will briefly discuss their relationship to the Ottoman Armenian refugees. 
However, my primary interest lies in the Ottoman Armenian institutions that arrived with the 
refugees and recreated Ottoman Armenian structures in Syria. 
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Watenpaugh (2006) argues that support for Armenian refugees provided a platform upon 
which the French Mandate could justify its legitimacy in Syria (286). The French granted 
Armenians Syrian citizenship in 1923 and then their political status in Syria was further 
solidified when the Mandate officially recognized Armenians’ right to vote in assembly elections 
in 1928 (Migliorino 2008, 54; Watenpaugh 2006, 287).  This extension of citizenship is framed 
as a humanitarian move given that Armenians were stateless refugees following “the drawing of 
new boundaries” in the Middle East (Watenpaugh 2006:287). However, additionally explaining 
this move, the French saw the opportunity with the Armenians to introduce a large Christian 
population into the voting arena in order to combat the electoral power of the National Bloc, a 
party that sought Syrian independence from the French (Watenpaugh 2006, 287; Migliorino 
2008, 55). The religious leadership within the Armenian community supported the French in 
their political aims, coming into conflict with the Armenian nationalist parties introduced in 
Chapter I (Migliorino 2008, 56). 
Discussing the involvement of missionaries with the post-genocide Armenian refugees in 
Syria, Watenpaugh (2006) argues that these European missionaries became invested in the 
advancement and preservation of a distinct Armenian community, “for racially inflected 
humanitarian reasons” (285). Because of their status as an ethnically and religiously distinct 
community in Syria, the international community deemed these Christian Armenian refugees 
worthy of foreign protection (Watenpaugh 2006, 285). Boldly, Watenpaugh proposes crediting 
Armenian preservationism to this Western intervention. He writes, “Crucially, it could be argued 
that this notion of rescuing the community was unprecedented in the Armenian community and 
only existed as a peculiar feature of missionary paternalism” (Watenpaugh 2006, 285). He claims 
that at this early state of Armenian settlement in Syria, the Armenian community itself was not 
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involved in this attempted preservation of the “race.” Armenians who ended up among non-
Armenian communities were “rescued” either by missionaries or family members attempting to 
locate and reunite post-genocide, not due to a larger Armenian movement (285). 
Watenpaugh (2006) then further underscores the role of the mandatory government in the 
survival of Armenianness in Syria. He writes, “The French, drawing upon the support of 
international organizations, settled the refugees in separate distinct communities” (Watenpaugh 
2006, 291). Watenpaugh (2006) suggests that it is this distinction and separation created by the 
French that established a uniquely Armenian identity within Armenian communities in Syria. He 
argues: 
Had the community been allowed a ‘natural’ process of integration and assimilation, the 
profile of the Armenian community in the increasingly violent urban politics of Syria 
would have been significantly reduced. Instead, by navigating the fluid uncertainties of 
French colonial domination, and later those of the equally perilous independent postwar 
regimes, the Armenian community survived—perhaps the ultimate act of resistance. 
(Watenpaugh 2006, 287). 
 
Both the missionaries and the French colonial power in Syria contributed to this cultural 
‘survival’ that Watenpaugh references. The missionaries and the mandatory government were 
both invested in the success and cultural isolation of this Christian minority group in order to 
maintain influence over their colonial project in Syria. Watenpaugh (2006) describes the French 
approach to refugees as “intended to integrate the Armenians by providing them with property, a 
trade, or a profession in a way that intensified their linkage with the French state, the local 
economy, and agriculture” (289). He also discusses the architectural transformation of refugee 
camps in Aleppo. Under the direction of the French, the camps were converted into connected 
urban neighborhoods, “planned communities, the very forms of which reflected the intention of 
their planners to formulate modern, efficient social spaces that would assure the class ascendance 
of their inhabitance” (Watenpaugh 2006, 290). Through these tactics, Watenpaugh (2006) 
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argues, colonial forces shaped their survival of Armenian refugee communities in Syria. If we 
are to understand Armenian survival as a defining feature of post-genocide Armenian identity, 
Watenpaugh’s (2006) argument suggests that Armenian identity is predicated on the external 
force of colonial design. 
On the contrary, however, Migliorino (2008) focuses on the Armenian side of the 
equation within the French Mandate and claims, “From the very start of their new life as 
refugees, the Armenians worked hard to reconstruct an Armenian world in the post-Ottoman 
Levant” (45). This directly opposes the suggestion that the impulse to reconstruct and preserve a 
distinct identity was externally imposed. Further, the argument that Watenpaugh presents fails to 
account for the Ottoman Armenian institutional organization that he himself questions but does 
not return to address. In addition to the organizing function of these institutions, the argument 
fails to acknowledge the nationalistic purpose of such institutions as discussed in my first 
chapter, particularly in the context of the revolutionary political parties. Migliorino (2008) then 
argues, “the determination to reconstruct was stemming from the Armenian strong non-
assimilatory communal solidarity, or from the awareness of the fact that the Genocide could have 
indeed wiped out Armenian culture altogether” (46). His argument that the Armenian community 
was independently dedicated to national preservation coincides with the nationalistic tendencies 
that we have observed within Armenian diasporic institutions both before and after 1915. 
However, if we reject only Watenpaugh’s (2006) restricted focus on the role of European 
powers, we can reconcile these two perspectives and understand the preservation of 
Armenianness in Syria as a phenomenon stemming from a strong nationalistic drive and 
transnational institutions, but bolstered by colonial intervention. 
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Much of the Armenian story in this project has focused on the nationalistic 
preservationist drive of Armenians, despite the divisive political conflicts between parties, 
organizations, and the Church. However, Payaslian (2007) notes the lack of solidarity from 
preexisting Armenian communities in Syria as refugees from the genocide began to settle in 
Syria. He claims, “The ‘native’ Armenian population… viewed the incoming refugees as a 
financial burden and as a threat to their privileged position in society” (Payaslian 2007: 103). We 
must note this tension as a moment of division within the Armenian diaspora, one that even the 
existential threat of genocide fails to bridge. Whereas we frequently see enmity between different 
political factions of the diaspora put aside, as Tölölyan (2000) notes, “temporarily united by 
crisis” (123), “native” Syrian Armenians may present an exception as a community more 
thoroughly integrated into its host society and thus less transnationally engaged. 
All of the Syrian Armenians that I have encountered throughout the course of this project 
are the children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren of genocide survivors. An interviewee 
told me, however, that these pre-genocide Syrian Armenians were referred to by the Arabic term 
ermen edim, meaning old Armenians. He believes they primarily spoke Arabic, whereas the 
much larger post-genocide community spoke Armenian and Turkish. Also differentiating them, 
for the most part the ermen edim did not have the traditional “ian” surname ending. The only 
ermen edim this interviewee knew growing up in Syria were those who were married to the non-
edim and had thus joined their community. One Syrian Armenian I encountered in the United 
States had an Arabic last name in Syria because his paternal grandfather was of the ermen edim. 
However, upon migrating the US he added “ian” in order to better identify with his Armenian 
community.  
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Within the narrative of Armenian identity constructed around the genocide, this resistant 
host community emphasizes the varying priorities within any diaspora. Unlike the Armenian 
refugees and their institutional leaders attempting to rebuild community in refugee camps, the 
ermen edim were already a small but well-established community in Syria. And, unlike diasporic 
Armenians abroad sending support to refugee communities, they felt their status in Syria 
threatened by this influx of foreign Armenian refugees. Given the major separation and cultural 
differences between the ermen edim and the Armenian community formed by Ottoman 
Armenian refugees in Syria, the scope of this study will not cover the recent experiences of 
Syria’s ermen edim. 
Returning to the role of Armenian institutions, the refugees quickly began to reestablish 
an Armenian community and institutional structure with the construction of Armenian churches 
(Migliorino 2008:47). Migliorino (2008) notes, “In the memories of those who lived in person 
the experience of the refugee camps, the churches are often remembered as the first public 
buildings erected in the camps together with the schools, the first stones in the construction of a 
new Armenian world for the refugees” (50). The Church served to underline the refugees’ shared 
religious identity and, as a transnational organization, played a key role in connecting the 
isolated refugees with their global diasporic identity. 
The genocide displaced the Catholicos of Cilicia, who had presided over Apostolic 
Armenians in Western Armenia. This created a disconnect between Armenian refugees and their 
transnational religious structure. Migliorino (2008) writes, “For several years the Catholicosate 
survived as an unsettled refugee institution while, according to the pre-Genocide tradition, the 
mass refugees settling in Lebanon and Syria fell under the jurisdiction of the Armenian Patriarch 
of Jerusalem” (51). However, the Catholicosate of Cilicia eventually settled in Antelias, outside 
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of Beirut, in 1930 and regained jurisdiction (in 1929) over Armenian communities in Beirut, 
Damascus and Latakia. This was followed by “the re-establishment of the institutions regulating 
the internal life of the Apostolic community. These were modeled on the legacy of the Armenian 
millet experience and on the Armenian ‘national constitution’ of 1863” (Migliorino 2008:52).  
Though the Church had to recover from exile like the refugees themselves, its institutional 
importance played a significant part in making this possible. As discussed in chapter one, the 
institutional strength of the Armenian millet and the various Armenian institutions in the 
nineteenth century provided a blueprint for the reestablishment and preservation of Armenian 
cultural life post-genocide. 
Discussing the critical role played by religious institutions in the newly forming Syrian 
Armenian communities, Migliorino (2006) writes: 
Historical symbols and sanctuaries of Armenian traditions and cultural distinctiveness, 
the Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, and Evangelical Churches became, from the early days 
of the refugee displacements, pivotal institutions in the effort of (re) construction, and 
landmarks of the new Armenian landscape in Syria. The Churches could also re-establish 
their role as centres of aggregation and promotion of three, religiously-defined Armenian 
sub worlds, each endowed with a separate set of social institutions and practices. (para. 
12) 
 
Migliorino (2006) highlights the cultural significance of religious life in the Armenian 
community while also acknowledging existing divides in Armenian identity. Given the 
continuous significance of the Church in Armenian community life, I asked interviewees about 
the dividing impact of differing Christian sects. Unlike the role of political parties, Syrian 
Armenians that I spoke to felt that shared national and Christian identity surpassed the 
importance of differing Christian churches, which primarily organized social activity within the 
community, similar to compatriotic organizations. Interviewees who were educated in Syria in 
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the 1960s and 1970s told me that they attended school with members of the different churches, 
and they claimed division was limited to mild teasing.  
In addition to the churches, Migliorino (2006) notes the construction of schools as a first 
step toward the institutionalization of Armenian life in Syria (50). The focus on schools as some 
of the first diasporic institutions constructed in Syria highlights the importance of cultural 
education and resistance to assimilation for the generations of Armenians that would never know 
their homeland. The table below, Fig. 3, from Migliorino (2008) demonstrates the post-genocide 
growth of Armenian education in Syria. 38 Armenian schools in Syria were founded in the first 
two decades after the arrival the Ottoman Armenian refugees. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 (Migliorino 
2008:71, table 2.5) 
 
The need for Armenian education serves also as a response to the lack of unified cultural 
identity. The genocide presented the necessity of merging dissimilar and disconnected segments 
of diasporic Armenian life into a cohesive Armenian identity in order to preserve the nation. 
Migliorino (2006) argues, “The re-establishment of an Armenian world in Syria, as well as in all 
the post-genocide diasporas, was in fact largely a process of construction of a new Armenian 
cultural identity which was certainly drawing from the past, but which was also inevitably 
founded upon the immensity of the tragedy of the genocide and driven by the priorities of the 
refugee communal leadership of the time” (para. 10). This argument addresses questions that 
have arisen during my research about the relationship between Armenianness and the Armenian 
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Genocide. Payaslian (2007) similarly refers to the post-genocide “tortuous task of building 
institutions and constructing a cultural identity” (102). As they both use the word “construction” 
rather than preservation or reconstruction, we may understand that Armenian cultural identity as 
we understand it today does not predate 1915. Expressions of Armenian identity today seem 
overwhelmingly focused on genocide recognition, which unifies an otherwise heterogeneous and 
divided national group. Migliorino (2006) implies that Armenian identity today is founded in the 
threat of national and cultural extinction. 
Like the other spheres of institutional organization, Armenian political life and the 
nationalist parties had to recover their role in new diasporic communities post-genocide, but 
ultimately came to play a key part in this newly defined Armenian transnation. The Dashnak 
party, “gradually re-establishing itself as a diasporic organisation with a transnational structure 
and local branches in several countries,” expressed antagonism toward the Church and what 
Dashnaks believed to be its inappropriate interference in political affairs (Migliorino 2008:56). 
Though they were comparably positioned regarding Armenian political life in Syria, “the 
Hunchaks and the Ramkavars sharply opposed the Dashnak party, from which they were divided 
by widening ideological and tactical visions, in particular concerning Soviet Armenia” 
(Migliorino 2008:56). 
All of this institutional organization fell largely upon the elite leadership among 
Armenian refugees in Syria. Most Armenians were not involved in political life and “language 
and poverty were substantial barriers to participation in affairs that were outside the life in the 
camps or sphere of work” (Migliorino 2008:57). Non-elite Armenians did, however, participate 
in what Migliorino (2008) calls “regional patriotic unions” (57) and one of my interviewees 
referred to as “compatriotic organizations.” My interviewee described these groups primarily as 
 43 
social clubs based on village of origin in the Ottoman Empire. Describing their role in the 1920s, 
Migliorino (2008) writes, “Patriotic unions, named after cities or regions in the homeland… 
played a remarkable role in organising and managing self-help activities in the refugee camps, 
including the construction of shelters, schools and churches” (57). Through these organizations, 
Armenian refugees were able to participate in and contribute to institutional life. 
 Armenian printing in Syria further demonstrates the success of the Ottoman Armenian 
refugees in creating a complex Armenian world within their new communities. “The main centre 
of Armenian printing was initially Aleppo. Two printing presses were established in 1918 and 
about a dozen others followed starting from the early 1920s throughout the period of the 
Mandate” (Migliorino 2008:67). Soon after settling in Syria, Armenians had already begun to 
print their own publications. “By the end of the Mandate about thirty Armenian publications had 
appeared in Syria, including political newspapers, literary, religious, sports and satirical 
magazines, and student newsletters” (Migliorino 2008:69). In this short amount of time, 
Armenians recreated Armenian institutional life in Syria. 
The reestablishment of Armenian community life in Syria supports the idea in Chapter I 
that diasporic organizations existing prior to 1915 contributed strongly to the preservation of 
Armenianness in exile. When I say ‘in exile,’ however, I do not refer solely to the condition of 
Armenians post-genocide; I describe the persistence of Armenian diaspora under foreign rule for 
centuries. Payaslian (2007) notes, “Significantly, the new environment did not give rise to new 
political parties; instead, the transplanted pre-genocide political organizations, the 
Dashnaktsutiun. Hnchakian, and Ramkavar parties, were reconstituted, and by the middle of the 
1930s, the Dashnaktsutiun successfully claimed control over the political life of the emerging 
communities in Syria and Lebanon” (107). The idea of this permanent and continuous Armenian 
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diaspora becomes complicated, however, by the question of identity. Payaslian (2007) continues, 
“The political parties and community organizations thus led the difficult task of creating a 
common identity out of the various regional and local identities and dialects that had 
characterized the Armenian millet” (107). Like the references to “constructing” Armenian 
identity, Payaslian here presents the question of Armenianness and whether or not it predated the 
genocide. It would seem that the existence of these parties and organizations would suggest the 
existence of Armenian identity, even Armenian nationalism as I discuss in chapter one. Yet, 
Migliorino and Payaslian both suggest the need to “create a common identity” post-genocide. 
 
Armenian Communities in Syria before 2011 
 Prior to the beginning of the war in Syria, Armenians were well integrated into yet 
culturally and geographically separated from the rest of Syrian society. From numerous 
discussions with Syrian Armenians, I learned that the primary Armenian neighborhoods in 
Aleppo were Aziziyeh, Suleimaniyeh, and Al Midan – known by Armenians as Nor Kyugh, 
meaning New Village. Discussing life for Armenians in Syria, Payaslian (2007) emphasizes the 
centrality of the community and its institutions. He claims, “The basis for political socialization 
has been the Armenian family, private educational institutions, and various community 
organizations whose primary object has been to perpetuate Armenian cultural identity and only 
secondarily Syrian national identity. These strongly tradition-inclined institutions, as established 
by the survivors of the genocide, exercised considerable command over the cognitive 
development of the next generation” (Payaslian 2007, 101). This description of the spheres in 
which Syrian Armenian operate and develop political awareness is consistent with the narrative 
constructed through my interviews with Syrian Armenians. With the exception of my one 
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interviewee from Damascus, the people I interviewed all lived in Armenian neighborhoods in 
Aleppo, moved within Armenian social and political circles, and attended Armenian schools 
(several even attended Armenian colleges). Armenian cultural identity was certainly central to 
everyday Armenian life in Aleppo. 
 Though the largest community of Armenians was in Aleppo, there were still significant 
Armenian populations in other Syrian cities. Given my limited contact with Armenians from 
elsewhere in Syria, I can only speak briefly to the experience of my one Armenian source from 
Damascus. The Armenian community still played a significant role in daily life – especially 
through NGOs, social clubs and religious activity –, but it did not create an environment as all-
encompassing and insular as that in Aleppo. My interviewee, a dentist, interacted regularly with 
both Arab and Armenian clients. His children attended Armenian schools until high school, but 
then attended an international American school, as the Armenian education system was not as 
extensive as that in Aleppo. 
The diasporic Armenian political parties – Dashnak, Hunchak, and Ramkavar – have 
played a major role in political and everyday life for Armenians in Syria. Though they initially 
vied for power with the religious authorities, the parties successfully secured political control 
within the Armenian community. “Since the 1940s the Armenian nationalist parties gradually 
emerged as the uncontested leaders of the community, increasingly able to speak in the name of 
the Armenians, efficient at mobilizing (or intimidating) the public and monopolizing political 
activities and communal formal institutions” (Migliorino 2006, para.17). When discussing the 
political parties, one of my interviewees also noted that Armenian education in Aleppo occurred 
in large part along party lines. Most Armenian schools were, and likely still are, informally 
associated with a political party.  
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The non-profits through which young Armenians participate in activities such as scouts 
are also aligned with particular parties. The groups promote nationalistic cultural expression and 
preservation, ensuring younger generations understand and connect with their Armenian identity. 
“Many Armenian families participate in the activities of Hamazkayin, Nor Serount, Tekeyan, 
AGBU, all chapters of larger transnational networks of the Armenian diaspora aimed at the 
promotion of Armenian literature, music, dance, and theatre” (Migliorino 2006, para. 35). 
Migliorino (2006) describes one function of these clubs as fostering “important connections of 
the community with the wider Armenian cultural world, and [placing] Aleppo on the map of the 
inter-Armenian cultural exchanges” (para. 35). NGOs associations with the political parties 
would of course suggest that Armenian youth should be not only culturally, but also politically 
engaged in the Armenian transnation. 
 Throughout the 20th century, tension between the different Armenian parties in Syria has 
peaked and then subsided again in recent decades. Migliorino (2006) writes, “the Armenian 
nationalist parties were caught in a heated confrontation over the issue of the relations with 
Soviet Armenia and, more in general, over the struggle for communal leadership… During the 
1950s, the ‘Armenian cold war’ reached its peak, with the Dashnak party eventually emerging as 
the hegemonic force within the Armenian communities of the Levant” (para. 19). Today, 
Dashnak remains the largest of the three nationalist parties. 
Regarding the conflict between the parties, one Syrian Armenian claimed that it reached 
the point where members of the different parties were killing each other in the streets, and the 
government had to get involved. Another told me that the conflict emerged because the 
Dashnaks realized that they would not be able to resist the Soviets, so they surrendered to the 
USSR. Stances toward the USSR divided the Armenian parties, and then, he claims, “conspiracy 
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theories” in the early 40s about meetings between the parties and both sides of World War II 
caused further tension. Finally, he claims that during the 1956 election of the Holy See of Cilicia, 
the Dashnaks backed one candidate and while the Hunchaks and Ramkavars backed the other. 
Enmity between the parties remained strong during the 50s and 60s, but my interviewee argued 
that, with more open and educated generations coming of age, this conflict has significantly 
subsided. This seems likely, as the Syrian Armenians that I have talked to during the course of 
this study seemed less concerned about political affiliation than the history would suggest. At 
one time, an interviewee tells me, people would react to seeing a member of an opposing party 
like they were seeing a Turk. Through this comparison, he references the animosity of many 
Armenians towards the Turks since the Armenian Genocide, thus emphasizing the extreme 
tension between the parties. 
  Despite the significant role of politics within the Armenian communities of Syria, the 
communities have had minimal involvement in local Syrian politics. One Syrian Armenian told 
me that, since 1970, there has always been a least one Armenian in Syria’s parliament. He claims 
that there is an unwritten agreement ensuring that Aleppo always elects one Armenian. This 
estimation matches closely with Migliorino’s (2006) account, which cites that since 1973, “the 
Armenians have maintained an individual, but continuous presence in Syrian parliament” (para. 
28). Despite this, Armenians have not significantly participated in local Syrian politics 
(Migliorino 2006, para. 32). Migliorino (2006) also writes: 
Armenian politics focused mostly on the interests and problems of the Armenian people, 
both at the level of the Syrian-Armenian community and at the wider, international level. 
The approach of the Armenian nationalist parties towards Syria was generally one of 
loyalty, combining a sense of gratefulness for the country and people which had in some 
way provided a new home to the Armenians with the interest to maintain a system of 
institutions that had offered a number of advantages for the Armenian communal life. 
(para. 18) 
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This sense of gratefulness to the Syrian government and the Syrian people is a common theme 
throughout my interviews. 
Migliorino (2008) writes that the 1960s marked a period of intense political non-
participation on the part of Armenians in Syria during the rise of Ba’athism (109). The regime 
placed restrictions on many Armenian activities deemed political. From the early 70s onward, 
the Syrian government became more tolerant of Armenian community activity and organization. 
The Assad regime and Armenian communities had an informal understanding, that “the practice 
of state control over the communal activities of the Armenians would be relaxed in return for the 
Armenians’ support, or acquiescence” (Migliorino 2008, 156-57). Likely for this reason, 
compounded by fear of Islamist leadership, many Syrian Armenians become defensive of the 
Assads, praising their relatively secular administrations, when discussing the war in Syria. Still, 
as this agreement with the regime was unofficial, the political standing of Armenian institutions 
in Syria would remain uncertain and subject to the whim of the Assad regime (Migliorino 2008, 
157).  
The Assad regime’s leniency toward Armenian communities co-occurs with the 
administration's resistance to acknowledging Syria’s ethnic diversity and thus the fact that 
Armenian institutions are in many ways defined by their unique cultural and ethnic separation 
from the rest of the country. However, Armenians and the regime alike circumvent the issue of 
ethnicity by framing Armenian institutions and their activities within the field of religious 
allowances. Migliorino (2005) writes, “The question of ethnicity has been in fact one of the most 
persistent taboos in the Syrian official discourse over the last decades. The regime has granted 
forms of recognition to the country’s traditionally rich religious diversity, but it has 
systematically played down the existence of allegiances to distinct communal or ethno-cultural 
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identities and – most crucially – it has severely obstructed their autonomous political 
mobilization” (para. 3). Ironically, despite the Assad regime’s denial of ethnic diversity, it “has 
continued to use ethnic and sub-ethnic allegiances as a strategic political resource” (Migliorino 
2008, 4). 
As I have discussed, political activity within Armenian communities in Syria has been 
severely restricted since the mid-20th century. Simon Payaslian (2007) argues that Armenians in 
Syria have remained politically marginal throughout the decades and subscribe to a “subaltern 
consciousness” due to the hardships they have endured in exile. He writes, “A fuller 
understanding of the immigrant’s exilic existence would require a socio-psychological 
assessment of the subaltern consciousness, but clearly the diasporic community’s exilic existence 
obstructed the development of a sense of permanence” (106). Though his argument and his 
discussion of the subaltern provide an interesting and compelling intellectual proposition, they 
do not align with the narrative presented by my Syrian Armenian interviewees. 
Discussing this supposed sense of impermanence felt by Armenians in Syria, Payaslian 
(2007) writes: 
Although legally citizens, Armenians in Syria are nevertheless psychologically, 
culturally, and economically transient… As ‘tenants,’ Armenians for their part have not 
developed a deep sense of historical identification with the place and therefore have 
preferred to exit when possible. The force of this argument has been most visible with 
respect to the country’s compulsory military service, which compelled many Armenians 
to emigrate rather than serve” (113-14). 
 
Payaslian’s mention of emigration to avoid military service resonates for me, as I was aware of 
this trend, and I know several older Syrian Armenians who moved to Beirut for this purpose. 
However, my interviewees strongly disputed his psychological assumption that Armenians lack a 
sense of belonging in Syria. Though neither Payaslian (2007) nor I have advanced psychological 
training, I can recount some of what my Syrian Armenian interviewees told me. Regarding 
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avoiding conscription, several Syrian Armenians argued that this phenomenon was not unique to 
Armenians. One of these interviewees had himself served has a lieutenant in the army and 
attended the military academy. He claimed that while Armenians left the country to escape 
military service, Sunni Syrians would bribe the army in order to excuse their children from 
serving. I have not confirmed this claim nor compared rates at which different groups avoid 
military service in Syria, but I believe the takeaway remains – the Syrian Armenians I have 
spoken with do not feel they lack a sense of belonging and permanence in Syria, at least no more 
than any other group. 
Though they subscribe to a sort of dual identity, the Syrian Armenians I spoke to 
identified as Syrian, and those displaced by the war wanted nothing more than to continue living 
in Syria. As one example, I interviewed a few Syrian Armenians in Armenia who had applied for 
and received Armenian citizenship prior to fleeing Syria and, though they wanted Armenian 
citizenship as diasporic Armenians, never intended to live anywhere but Syria. Still, Payaslian 
(2007) argues, “As a result of the emphasis placed on cultural survival, along with other 
obstacles to assimilation, the Armenian community, even in its more developed form decades 
later, did not experience a deep sense of belonging in Syria, of full acculturation, except in the 
most formal, legal sense—its members were loyal citizens fulfilling their legal obligations as 
citizens” (109). By claiming that remaining culturally distinct prevents a sense of belonging, 
Payaslian suggests the impossibility of having multiple, coexisting identities. Yet, the 
experiences and the feelings expressed by my interviewees suggest a different conclusion – they 
demonstrate a joint identity expressed through a sense of belonging both within Syria and within 
transnational Armenian spaces. 
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Payaslian (2007) also supports his claim of Armenian subalternity in Syria by arguing 
that Armenians lack a political voice (115-16), but this does not seem unique to non-Arabs or 
non-Muslims in Assad’s Syria. Payaslian (2007) writes, “Rather than risk their physical safety, 
imprisonment, or other human rights violations, those who disagree with the system choose to 
‘exit’ as a less costly option” (116-17). Though this may be true, it fails to fully demonstrate his 
conclusion, that Armenians in Syria lack a sense of belonging – that they remain subaltern. He 
attempts to claim political subalternity for Armenians under a dictatorial regime, and 
acknowledges their generally privileged economic status.  
More persuasively, Payaslian (2007) cites the decline in the Armenian population in 
Syria as evidence of Armenian “exit.” Between the 1960s and 2005, the Armenian population in 
Syria dropped from around 150,000 to around 80,000 (Payaslian 2007, 118). According to 
Payaslian (2007), the population is decreasing because, given their marginal political status in 
Syria, “Armenians either remain voiceless in the realm of diaspora subalternities or exit” (123). 
Yet, all of the Syrian Armenians that I interviewed still disagreed with Payaslian’s (2007) 
argument that Armenians lack a sense of permanence in Syria. In response to Payaslian’s (2007) 
claim, one interviewee outlined the various events that he felt spurred Armenian emigration from 
Syria throughout the 20th century. 
The first of these events is the Armenian repatriation movement between 1946 and 1949, 
which I discussed in Chapter I.7 However, this movement probably occurs too early to be 
relevant to Payaslian’s argument. Only 20 years after Ottoman Armenian refugees settled in 
Syria, the Armenian communities likely would not have had the time to develop a strong sense 
                                                
7 For more on this movement, see page 26 and Yousefian (2011). 
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of belonging. Still, it does represent an “exit.” Alternatively, though, we could see the movement 
not as a rejection of Syria and other host countries, but as an expression of nationalistic duty.  
Then, argues my interviewee, in 1960 and 1961, Armenians were faced with “ultra-
nationalism and oppression” due to Nasser’s United Arab Republic. He claims that political 
oppression caused a large wave of immigration to Lebanon at this time. Migliorino echoes this 
sentiment. In reference to pan-Arabism and Syria’s union with Nasser’s Egypt in the late 1950s, 
Migliorino (2008) writes, “In Syria, on the contrary [to Lebanon], political developments 
severely restricted the spaces for Armenian public participation” (100). He then adds, “The 
evolution of the state during the union was once again severely restrictive for civil liberties and 
considerably damaged the system of Armenian communal institutions” (Migliorino 2008, 104). 
Payaslian (2007) writes, “Nasserism and its attendant pan-Arab nationalism exhibited deep 
resentment, sometimes bordering on intolerance, toward the Armenians” (112). Under Nasser, 
Syria became a “police dictatorship,” and tension rose between the regime and the Dashnak party 
due to the Dashanaks’ sympathy for the West. Migliorino (2008) credits increased violence 
between the Dashanaks and the government for the emigration of Armenians during this time. 
While the Syrian Armenian I interviewed correctly attributed this movement to the repressive 
atmosphere under Nasser and Arab nationalism, Migliorino’s (2008) account is more specific. 
He writes, “The crisis of Dashnak-state relations eventually resulted in the migration of hundreds 
of Armenian-Syrian families to Lebanon and the position of the Dashnak party in the country 
was severely weakened” (Migliorino 2008, 104). 
My interviewee also referenced ta’mim, or nationalization, as a major contributor to 
Armenian emigration from Syria. Payaslian (2007) explains, “Nasserist economic policies of 
nationalization also had detrimental consequences for the Armenian community as they led to 
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the mass emigration of upper- and middle-class Armenians, first to neighboring Lebanon and 
thence to the distant shores of Europe, North and South Americas and Australia” (113). 
However, anthropologist Aseel Sawalha (2010) and historian Samir Kassir (2010) both refer to 
this exodus of upper-class Syrian capitalists without referring specifically to the Armenians, 
suggesting that this phenomenon was more widespread. They discuss the importance of this 
movement for the growth of the Lebanese economy (Sawalha 2010, 34; Kassir 2010, 358). 
Therefore, we may infer that this emigration was not unique to Armenians and thus not 
illustrative of their exceptionally marginal political status. 
Through these waves of emigration, we can also see the creation of a unique Syrian 
Armenian diaspora within the larger Armenian diaspora. Whether or not we can say that this 
group maintains a unique cultural identity, the exoduses certainly create familial networks 
throughout the world for Syrian Armenians. 
In a decade-old article, Migliorino (2006) argues that the “future of Armenian cultural 
diversity in Syria” relies partly on “the transnational connections that the diaspora maintains, and 
regards the extent to which the interaction with other ‘Armenian worlds’ in the diaspora will be 
allowed” (para. 40). However, with the war in Syria that began in 2011, “the transnational 
connections that the diaspora maintains” take on a new role. In the next chapter, I will discuss 
how the transnational networks maintained by Syrian Armenians impact their experience of 
forced migration and integration into the host country. 
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Chapter III: Mobilizing Diasporic Networks 
 
Tölölyan (1996) asserts that one way diasporas engage with the homeland is by working 
to help “one’s needier kin in yet a third country,” meaning a country other than the host country 
or the homeland (15). The conflict in Syria presents a clear case where the Armenian diaspora 
throughout the world can use its resources to affect change for “needier” sectors of the global 
diaspora. In addition to the reach of transnational Armenian organizations as discussed in the 
first two chapters, the different waves of migration seen in the previous chapters create 
transnational social networks on the individual level for Syrian Armenians. How do these 
institutional and personal networks affect the choices and experiences of displaced Syrian 
Armenians? 
 
‘Returning’ to Armenia 
I walked through Yerevan’s Halebi Shuga, an underground strip of shops called Aleppo 
Market in the Armenian capital. I was nervous about whom to approach for my first interview, 
but my cousin assured me that any of the shop owners would probably be happy to talk to me. I 
entered into a small empty shop and asked the woman working if she had come from Aleppo 
recently and if she would allow me to interview her.  
As the name of the market might suggest, this woman and her sister had lived their whole 
lives in Aleppo and arrived in Armenia together in 2012. Their grandparents arrived in Syria as 
survivors of the Armenian Genocide. When I ask when her family first settled in Syria, she 
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seemed to anticipate my line of thought. “Now we have lived a second emigration,” she tells me 
unprovoked, “we used to hear the story; now we actually lived it.”8 
Before the war had affected their lives in Aleppo, the sisters had heard that it was easy to 
get Armenian citizenship. She tells me, “We said, why not? We’re Armenian. Let’s get the 
passport.” After applying for Armenian citizenship, they learned in April 2012 that their 
passports were ready and that they should fly to Yerevan to pick them up. At this point, the war 
had begun. She tells me, “We said if the war doesn’t get worse, or what’s going to happen, we 
don't know, we’ll come in October and get our passports, then go back… and we stayed here.” 
Again, she emphasizes that she had no intention of living in Armenia: “I’m Armenian, so 
I wished to get the citizenship, but I hadn’t thought I would come live here or stay. The war was 
that difficult, brought such difficult days that we were forced to stay here. We came unprepared.” 
Because they traveled to Armenia thinking they would stay for only a short visit, the sisters were 
unable to pack up their home or the shop they owned in Aleppo. They arrived for the passports 
and were not able to return to Syria due to the war and the destruction of their neighborhood. She 
explained, “Because our house’s area is very bad – our store is damaged; our house is damaged. 
It’s very bad. Actually we were right at the frontline between the Syrian army and the terrorists. 
If we were to go back to Aleppo it would have to again be repaired, newly constructed – the 
house and the store.” The travel, at least, was easy. Because it was still the beginning if the war, 
they were able to travel by plane. 
After arriving in Armenia, they visited tourist destinations and enjoyed a holiday until 
realizing that they would not be able to return to Aleppo. “When we saw, no, from now on we’re 
going to stay here and live here, we have to also find a means to survive. The saved money runs 
                                                
8 This interview was conducted in Armenian, so the quotes that I include are all my own 
translations. 
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out  quickly – chellar [it can’t be] – you have to work, at least do a job, do something.” She 
indicates that she is now talking about her little shop in Halebi Shuga and continues, “For us, this 
is our work. We say it’s suitable. We did this work in Aleppo. But it was three stories. There was 
more, bigger, wider selection. Here, now… very small. From below zero starting over.” The 
narrative of starting over is consistent throughout all of my interviews, whether my interviewees 
reference losing a business, finding their education and degree irrelevant in their new home, or 
having to make new friends. 
In Halebi Shuga, this woman described to me the challenges she and her sister faced in 
starting a business in Armenia: “It was very difficult because we didn’t know this country’s laws. 
You have to get to know new laws, get to know new products, new people; you will work with 
businessmen. Everything was new. This was the difficulty. The laws were a bit difficult until we 
learned; we got used to it. Anywhere you go, in the beginning it’s a new country, a new city, new 
laws. You’re going to have difficulties.” One such difficulty was the tax system, which she noted 
was stricter than that in Syria. The moment the business opens, they owe taxes regardless of 
profit. 
 As I conceptualized this project, I wondered whether or not Syrian Armenians would 
belong to their own subgroup within the Armenian diaspora, operating principally within Syrian 
Armenian spaces in their host communities. Halebi Shuga demonstrates such a tendency and the 
dual identity of Syrian Armenians. The shop owner I spoke with explained that she and her sister 
found the space for their store when they came to buy from the other shops in Halebi Shuga. 
They were informed that there were empty shops where they could consider restarting the 
business they left in Syria. She told me, “We saw it… We liked it… We said since we’re all 
Halebtsi [from Aleppo] it will be easier to work together.” 
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When I asked if the Aleppo Armenians help each other in Yerevan, she replied that, of 
course, “Odaroutyan meches kone mege mouysin tserk da [When you’re in a foreign land, the 
least you can do is give each other a hand].” This formulation stands out given that she and 
several other Syrian Armenians I spoke to described Armenia as though becoming a citizen was 
the natural choice given their ethnic identity. Yet, this woman describes Armenia as a foreign 
land – one in which Syrian Armenians are surrounded by foreigners. She depicts Armenia more 
as a host country than as a “homeland” to which she has “returned.” Though this may seem 
contrary to her expression of Armenian identity, when we understand the Armenian nation as a 
transnation, her desire for Armenian citizenship can be framed as a desire for physical 
representation (the passport) of her identity as a diasporic Armenian. The Armenian spaces in 
which many Syrian Armenians feel most at home are not those within Armenia – a foreign 
country. Their Armenian nation exists within the diaspora and its deterritorialized 
reconceptualization of national space.  
 In terms of ending up in here, this interviewee says that she and her sister did not have 
the opportunity to consider going anywhere but Armenia, as they did not have time to plan. They 
realized once in Armenia that they would have to stay. Other members of her family who were 
still in Aleppo in 2012 ended up in Canada, where a branch of the family had settled in the 
1970s. The Canadian branch had been living in Beirut, like many Syrian Armenians, but left 
because of the Civil War in Lebanon. Most of the Syrian Armenians that I have spoken to either 
fled to Canada themselves or have friends and family members who did. However, several 
Syrian Armenians have mentioned to me that those with dual citizenship (with Armenia) are not 
eligible for refugee visas. This presents limitations for those with Armenian citizenship who 
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would prefer to move elsewhere, but ultimately Armenia’s dual citizenship laws help Syrian 
Armenians escape the war at home in Syria. 
As of April 2014, about 12,000 Syrian Armenians were living in Armenia (Călin-Ştefan 
2014, 63). In a recent paper, Georgia Călin-Ştefan (2014) discusses his study of the integration of 
displaced Syrian Armenians into the Republic of Armenia between 2011 and 2014. He explains 
that, when the conflict in Syria began in 2011, Armenia welcomed Syrian Armenians and 
worked to promote the ease of their integration (Călin-Ştefan 2014, 61). However, these first 
Syrian Armenians to migrate to Armenia were under the impression that the conflict would be a 
short one and the move would be temporary. For example, one project to ease this transition 
involved setting up a school in Armenia for refugees to continue their education following the 
“Syrian curriculum, in Arabic” (Călin-Ştefan 2014, 61). Referring to Chapter II, the 
establishment of Syrian education in Armenia ironically presents an inversion of the construction 
of Armenian schools by Ottoman Armenian refugees in Syria.9 It also provides further evidence 
that Syrian Armenians have adopted a secondary, dual identity through their relationships with 
their Syrian host country. If the focus on Syrian education in Armenia does not demonstrate 
Syrian Armenians’ sense of belonging in Syria, at minimum it shows their desire to return home 
to their Armenian communities in Syria. 
In terms of the legal questions of mobility, in addition to a 1995 law allowing individuals 
of Armenian ethnicity to secure Armenian citizenship, a 2012 “government decree allowed 
people to apply for Armenian citizenship in consulates and at the end of 2012, foreign citizens of 
Armenian origin who take refuge from acts of violence did not require a visa or residency 
permit” (Călin-Ştefan 2014, 62). Călin-Ştefan writes that these, and additional measures, 
                                                
9 Refer to page 40 in Chapter II 
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facilitated and streamlined the citizenship process for Syrian Armenian. The Armenian 
government has taken seriously its role in “the Armenia-diaspora partnership,” facilitating the 
mobility of Syrian Armenians – if only to the republic of Armenia – and minimizing the legal 
challenges of crossing borders during forced migration. 
Călin-Ştefan further discusses in his study the role of Armenian NGOs in providing 
services to Syrian Armenians. He writes, “NGOs like The Aleppo Compatriotic Charitable 
Organization implemented emergency relief operations to people in Syria and also provided 
support, mentoring and additional help in exiting conflict zones and transitioning to the Republic 
of Armenia” (Călin-Ştefan 2014, 62). The Armenian NGOs make up an important part of the 
Armenian diaspora. These organizations exist both in the country of Armenia and in Armenian 
communities around the world, and represent an important part of the diasporas engagement with 
the idea of homeland.  
Călin-Ştefan’s study discusses some of the challenges that have faced the Armenian 
government and NGOs in seamlessly integrating Syrian Armenians. Though still economically 
weak, by continuing to prioritize the Armenian diaspora and offering citizenship to diasporic 
Armenians, the Armenian republic serves as an important center for the diaspora.  
 
Canada 
Based on the group of Syrian Armenians that I spoke with, Canada appears to be one of 
the most common destinations for Syrian Armenians due to personal social networks and the 
government’s relatively open policy towards accepting refugees. The process is difficult, but 
seems much easier when compared with securing travel documents to the United States. 
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 I spoke with a family who had arrived in Canada just two months prior to our 
conversation. Before being allowed to travel to Canada, the family had taken two busses from 
Aleppo to Beirut in order to interview at the Canadian Consulate and undergo the necessary 
medical examinations for visas. They then had to wait indefinitely in Beirut until their visas were 
processed. This time period can vary significantly, but this family received their visas after 
spending about half year in Beirut following the interviews. Like many Syrian Armenians 
moving to Canada, their visa was sponsored by an Armenian organization in addition to a 
Canadian relative who served as guarantor. Both the institutional and familial ties that Syrian 
Armenians have to Canada reflect previous migration movements. The familial ties likely reflect 
specifically Syrian Armenian migration, as discussed in the context of emigration from Syria. 
The institutional network, on the other hand, reflects the wide reach of the Armenian diaspora in 
general and its communities. 
The family I spoke with told me that the two primary organizations in Toronto 
sponsoring Syrian Armenians are Hay Getron – the Armenian Community Center in Toronto – 
and Armenian Family Support Services. This family was sponsored through Armenian Family 
Support Services, which offers resettlement in Toronto to “Syrian or Iraqi Armenian Refugees 
with a qualified Canadian Sponsor living in the GTA [Greater Toronto Area]” (Armenian Family 
Support Services 2017). The co-sponsor, in many cases a family member, “must agree to 
FULLY FINANCIALLY SUPPORT and help deliver settlement assistance and share the 
responsibility for supporting the sponsored refugees” (Armenian Family Support Services 2017). 
In terms of integration into Canadian society and Canadian Armenian communities, the 
institutions discussed in my first two chapters ease the transition into the host country. For one, 
the NGOs that sponsor Armenians coming to Canada serve as first institutional points of contact 
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and support for arriving refugees. Additionally, many Syrian Armenians arriving in Canada are 
quickly introduced to their local Armenian Church, around which social and religious life can be 
structured. 
The youth also may find structured Armenian community life through AGBU or 
Homenetmen’s youth programs. When I spoke to this family in Toronto, their teenage daughter 
had already become active in their local Homenetmen chapter. She participated in 
Homenetmen’s Armenian scouts in Aleppo for 15 years, volunteering at food banks and teaching 
Armenian children. She tells me that participating in Homenetmen’s cultural and volunteer 
activities makes her feel better in Canada. She told me, “I love in my heart – not just I love – I 
love in my heart… I love helping Armenian people, and I want to one day go back to Armenia 
and help Armenians.” When I ask why she would like to move to Armenia, where she has never 
been, she explains as though it should obvious, “My name is Armenian and my last name is 
Armenian so I’m Armenian Armenian… original Armenian.” Though she traveled to Canada 
with her family and would rather move on her own to Armenia, she has become an active 
member of the diasporic Armenian community in Toronto. She also says that the Armenian 
community center is helping her find a job, and she is excited to practice speaking English with 
me. 
However, her 22-year-old cousin has had a more difficult time integrating. She has had 
trouble meeting people and making friends in Canada. She participated in scouts through AGBU 
while in Aleppo, but she told me that she is not involved in the same way as her teenage cousin 
because Toronto AGBU is far from her home and she does not know anyone. She seems more 
reserved than her cousin, preventing her from participating in community activities. Though she 
 63 
has not been motivated to get involved in life in Canada, this young woman has taken advantage 
of government sponsored English classes.  
This family moved to Toronto because their Canadian relative provided them the 
opportunity for sponsorship. The Armenian I spoke to from Damascus was sponsored by an Arab 
friend from Syria. A young woman I interviewed in Toronto came through a family friend, but 
feels alone because a number of her friends from Aleppo have been resettled in Montreal. 
Armenian networks (and for the man from Damascus, Syrian networks) have allowed many 
Syrian Armenians to flee Syria for Canada. Once there, Armenian community and transnational 
organizations provide opportunities for integration into Canadian Armenian life. 
 
The U.S. 
 In the United States, the refugees that I interviewed would not be legally classified as 
such. Instead, most of the Syrian Armenian that have recently arrived in Glendale, California, a 
major hub of diasporic Armenian activity, received green cards before the war in Syria began but 
chose not to immigrate. The exceptions to this rule, according to one Syrian Armenian, are visas 
for handicapped refugees or for the wife of a shahid [martyr in Arabic]. In retrospect, I should 
have asked to clarify this comment, as I am not sure who the martyrs are in this situation. 
One interviewee told me that he got his green card in 2004 and tried moving to the 
United States several times, but ultimately he decided that he did not like it and remained in 
Syria until fleeing the war in 2012. When he originally arrived in the United States with his wife 
and teenage daughter, he settled elsewhere in California. The family soon moved to Glendale, 
however, in order to be around other Armenians.  
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 In the United States, some of my interviewees are able to subsist by working as language 
tutors and teachers and by receiving social services, including food stamps. According to a 
Syrian Armenian who arrived in 2012 with his family, private Armenian schools support Syrian 
Armenians in the community by giving major tuition discounts. Still, he chose to send his 
children to the local public schools. Like in Syria after the Genocide and in Armenia today, 
educational institutions play an important role in the integration and cultural preservation of 
refugee communities.  
 Many Syrian Armenians, regardless of where they have chosen to settle during the war, 
claim that they will return to Syria and the conflict ends. When I asked one of my interviewees in 
Glendale about this, he argued that most of these people would not end up returning, if and when 
the war ends. He explained that he has been in the United States for five years now, his children 
are growing up here, and only the eldest of his three daughters even remembers Arabic. He 
believes that, except for those in Beirut, most people’s experience will reflect his own and they 
will not return to Syria. 
 In response to some people’s claim that Armenians should stay in Syria in order to 
preserve the kaghut, this same interviewee repeats throughout our conversation that the situation 
in Syria is “not our war” and that “two Arab brothers are fighting each other so we can’t pick a 
side.”10 Based on his characterization of the war in Syria as between “two Arab brothers,” I 
inquired Armenians’ sense of belonging in Syria. He countered, “Syria is my country. But two 
brothers are fighting – whose side should I take? Neither is right. Armenians say the president, 
but what if he’s not right?” “You can rebuild schools,” he said, “but you can’t get back life. It’s 
                                                
10 These comments are translated from Armenians 
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not our war.” After all, the contents of this project might suggest that Armenians are constantly 
rebuilding. 
 Regarding the transnational structure of the diasporic political parties, their role in the 
diaspora arose during one of my interviews in Glendale. A middle-aged Syrian Armenian noted 
that he is a card-carrying Dashnak and had been on the organizing committee in Aleppo. When 
he came to the United States, he brought his transfer paperwork to join the local chapter, but he 
did not follow through with the paperwork. It strikes me that the political parties, which are 
associated with the various youth oriented organizations, provide a similar structure for adult 
Armenians as the scouts provide for the youth. Both allow diasporic Armenians to join their local 
chapter, engage with their Armenian identity, and remain connected to the larger transnation 
through these transnational institutions. 
 Finally, the Syrian Armenian Relief Fund (SARF) is a Glendale-based organization that 
sends financial support to Armenians still in Syria. Unlike the organizations in Canada, SARF 
does not attempt to resettle Syrian Armenians in the United States. Instead, they raise money 
through a telethon, in order to provide “water, food, shelter, health, and education” to Armenians 
in war-torn Syria. However, several interviewees argued that the Armenian community is not 
doing enough for Syrian Armenians. I interviewed a Syrian Armenian who arrived in the United 
States several decades ago, long before the war in Syria, and is particularly involved in the 
Armenian community. He laments that the diasporic community takes a “sentimental approach” 
toward the situation of Syrian Armenian – that they say, “we have to help,” but then forget as 
they are “occupied by daily duties.” 
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Lebanon 
 Most Armenians fleeing Syria pass through Lebanon for visa interviews and to fly out of 
the airport. While not a first choice for relocation, Beirut seems to be most people’s backup plan. 
Almost everyone has an aunt or a cousin or some other relative whom they say they would join if 
not for their plan A. Given the many waves of migration from Syria to Lebanon, deep familial 
ties exist between the Armenian community in Aleppo and the community in Beirut. As a transit 
stop, however, many have complained that Beirut is too expensive and that they just burn 
through their savings while waiting to hear about visas, even if they find a job. I have been told 
that many actually prefer to wait in Syria.  Still, the diaspora does provide Syrian Armenians 
with networks that facilitate life in Lebanon, and most of the diasporic institutions that they have 
in Aleppo are present in Beirut as well. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Though the Armenian transnation remains deeply divided by political differences, 
Armenians globally unite in order to ensure national survival. This is especially the case in the 
last century, since the nation faced the existential threat of extermination during the Armenian 
Genocide. Tölölyan (1996) suggests that diasporas remain linked transnationally partially 
because of their collective memory (13), which is certainly the case for Armenians and the 
memory as the Genocide as it has been passed down and disseminated as part of the national 
identity. 
Like the woman in Armenia who told me, “We used to hear the story; now we actually 
lived it,” many Syrian Armenians have drawn parallels between their experience of the war in 
Syria and the previous generation’s experience of Genocide. The recent film, Houses without 
Doors, makes this comparison by presenting depictions of everyday life in the filmmaker’s 
apartment in Syria during the war interspersed with archival and film footage depicting the 
Armenian Genocide. Though many draw this comparison, others that I have asked about it have 
responded dismissively saying, “they’re completely different.” 
Though the conflict in Syria has elicited these comparison and sporadic recognition from 
the Armenian community with social media movements like #savekessab, in support of the 
Armenian majority town in Syria, the plight of Syrian Armenians does not seem to garner to kind 
of interest from the diaspora that the Genocide continues to provoke a century after the fact. 
During the course of this project, I have joined numerous Armenian diaspora Facebook groups in 
order to stay current on the conversations dominating the transnational Armenian public sphere. 
Most recently, practically every post is about the new Armenian Genocide film, The Promise. I 
wonder if future social media analysis could compare the frequency over the past five years at 
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which Armenians have discussed the issue of Genocide recognition versus the very current issue 
of refugee Syrian Armenians. 
A young Armenian American that I know posted a picture of her and her fiancé in front 
of the poster for The Promise, a popular trend among Armenians on social media. She captioned 
it, “If our ancestors didn't survive, we wouldn’t have been able to see this movie. We wouldn’t 
have met each other. But, they survived and now it’s our turn to educate others. To start our own 
Armenian family and to keep the Armenian culture alive [Armenian flag emoji].” This victorious 
rhetoric of survival is common among Armenians, along with the social media hashtag 
#turkeyfailed. But, what about Syrian Armenians? Is this extremely nationalistic diaspora doing 
enough to ensure their survival? Throughout this project I have discussed the institutional 
diasporic structures that have allowed for the preservation of a transnational Armenia. These 
institutions are working once again on behalf of Syrian Armenians – ensuring their mobility and 
successful integration into host communities. However, like in Ottoman Armenian refugee 
communities in Syria, this organization does not seem to extend down from institutions and their 
leadership.  
As the great granddaughter of four Armenian Genocide survivors, the importance of 
recognition is not lost on me. However, as the daughter, granddaughter, niece, cousin of Syrian 
Armenians, I wonder to what extent the wider Armenian transnation puts its resources toward the 
conflict in Syria and to what extent the differing factions of the global Armenian community will 
unify over the threat and crisis faced by Armenians in Syria. How many people show up to April 
24th marches around the world, publicize The Promise on social media? And how many of these 
people have supported Syrian Armenians in the past 5 years? 
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